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ABSTRACT 
A FRESH APPROACH TO ANALYZING 
JOHN MCPECK'S CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING
by
Debra Anne Boussey
John McPeck's conception of critical thinking, as 
developed in Critical Thinking and Education, has had a 
profound effect upon the Critical Thinking Movement. With 
its allegiance to subject-specificity and epistemology 
rather than to a generalized set of skills, it has forced 
theorists in the movement to consider possibilities they 
either missed or ignored. Such theorists have found it 
necessary to confront McPeck's conception and his arguments 
before they can satisfactorily justify their own.
In the critical thinking literature, however, theorists 
tend to dismiss the positive contributions he has made 
and to attack the arguments McPeck makes about individual 
points. They mistakenly believe that that approach will 
invalidate his whole project.
I contend that McPeck's conception of critical thinking
depends on three things: a three premise argument that
concludes critical thinking is conceptually linked to
epistemology, two definitions, and ten features that outline
iv
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what critical thinking does and does not include. The 
above can be understood independently; however, it is only 
when they act in concert that they comprise McPeck's 
conception of critical thinking. I further contend that 
critical thinking is explained in terms of other related 
concepts, such as rationality and epistemology, that also 
rest on the tenets of McPeck's main argument.
I will show that the above interdependence leads to 
two maladies - inconsistency and imprecision. His 
conception is inconsistent inasmuch as the argument for 
critical thinking leads to the conclusion that there are 
as many concepts of critical thinking as there are subjects. 
The imprecision of critical thinking and the other concepts 
upon which it depends contributes to the inconsistency 
by creating an atmosphere in which it is possible to derive 
many concepts of critical thinking and by themselves 
becoming many concepts rather than one overriding concept.
v
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CHAPTER ONE
MCPECK'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITICAL THINKING MOVEMENT
After two thousand years of domination, evidence 
strongly suggests that formal logic has been deposed as 
the only paradigm of good reasoning. Its dominant position 
was washed away in a revolution that was slow in coming, 
yet inexorable once it began. The movements counter to 
formal logic basically charged that it was incapable of 
assessing arguments in their natural settings, that" it 
could not handle so-called 'everyday' arguments. The 
basic tenets behind this revolution took hold only in the 
last three decades. Once the justice of those charges 
was recognized, reform became inevitable.
I say 'movements' rather than 'movement' because two
identifiable movements have emerged from the revolution
- the critical thinking movement and the informal logic
movement. The above are largely treated as distinct yet
2
complementary. Regardless of the exact nature of the 
relationship between the critical thinking movement (CTM) 
and the informal logic movement (ILM), they have attained 
as prominent a position as formal logic in theories on 
evaluating arguments.^
The time for revolution, however, has passed and today
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
we are in an evolutionary stage. Granted, people accept 
the existence of a concept called critical thinking. 
Granted, people accept the existence of a concept called 
informal logic. What is not fully accepted is the nature 
of the former concepts. What are their boundaries? What 
assumptions lie at their hearts? How are they related 
to one another? How are they related to formal logic?
Can they be taught? Should they be taught? If so, how? 
Ever since Ennis published "A Concept of Critical Thinking 
A Proposed Basis For Research in Teaching and Evaluation 
of Critical Ability" in 1962, proponents of critical 
thinking and informal logic have been trying to come to 
grips with these questions and with their colleagues' 
theories. The concepts of critical thinking and informal 
logic have both been evolving.
Currently we are in a state of flux, since no one 
conception of critical thinking has managed to achieve 
dominance over any of the others. Even the most prominent 
contributors like Ennis and Paul are still modifying their 
conceptions as their ideas evolve and as their ideas are 
challenged. It seems to me that they are all seeking some 
way of explaining what is already there.
In The Concept of Mind (1955), Gilbert Ryle pointed 
out that Aristotle did not invent logic and syllogisms.
He gave names and overt formulations to things that people 
already knew were there and which they already used with 
proficiency. Aristotle's originality sprang from his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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recognition of the existence of logic and from the 
formulation of how it and its component parts function.
It is my contention that members of the two movements 
believe that they are doing for critical thinking and 
informal logic what Aristotle did for formal logic. In 
"Critical Thinking and the 'Trivial Pursuit' Theory of 
Knowledge," John McPeck says
. . . at times, my general view about the nature 
of critical thinking seems so obvious and 
commonsensical to me that it is almost 
embarrassing that it need be said at all, 
particularly to the learned audience for whom 
it was originally intended . . . The view of 
critical thinking which I have been defending 
simply tries to account for certain common, and 
what I thi^k obvious, facts about human 
reasoning.
The theorists in both traditions have accomplished 
the first step by recognizing the existence of critical 
thinking and informal logic. The second step, formulating 
and articulating how critical thinking and informal logic 
are conceived and how they operate, is the problem. A 
consensus has not been formed on all of the important 
points. Each theorist believes that his conception is 
the correct one and that he has, for the most part, 
described the way things actually operate when assessing 
natural or 'everyday' arguments and situations.
In reviewing the literature on critical thinking I 
found that a broad pattern emerged. The first stage 
consisted of Robert Ennis's work and the reviews, 
criticisms, and 'advances' that followed. His work was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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one of the real launching points for the CTM. In the early
years of the movement anyone writing about critical thinking
had to deal with his loose characterization of the
components of critical thinking. The literature reveals
that for many years, Ennis's work dominated the movement.
If this were not the case most of the people in the field
would not have felt compelled to correct, improve on, or
quote him. In almost everything that I have found on the
subject, even from recent years, Ennis's contributions
have been cited. He erected the primary pattern for
approaching critical thinking in "A Concept of Critical
Thinking" where he listed the skills that he believed to
5
be essential to critical thinking. Understandably the 
list has altered over time and his analyses of critical 
thinking have become more developed
Although Ennis remains a valued contributor, currently 
a dominant voice is that of Richard Paul who has taken 
Ennis's skills-and-dispositions account of critical 
thinking, acknowledged its worth, and concluded that it 
is not enough without an awareness of 'world views' in 
which we are all embedded and which shape and affect our
g
responses and critical abilities. Again, the literature 
reflects this shift.
There is one other stage that I have noticed and that 
is not, strictly speaking, a stage at all inasmuch as it 
neither builds on nor acts as the beginning of a chain 
of thought. This 'stage', which is the important one for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the purpose of this thesis, does not follow Paul nor does 
it precede Ennis; rather, it permeates them. We might 
look at McPeck's place as the counter-culture of the 1960's 
whose ideas and actions reverbated throughout the dominant 
culture and whose effects are being felt even today.
However you choose to put it, John McPeck, like Ennis and 
Paul, must be contended with. His primary work, Critical 
Thinking and Education, and its theme, critical thinking 
as subject, domain or discipline-specific, cannot be 
ignored.
During Ennis's dominant phase, commentators attempted 
to reconcile his approach with the criticisms and 
suggestions McPeck leveled against it. When he could not 
be reconciled, some would claim his criticisms were largely 
meaningless since the standard approach implicitly dealt 
with them. When Paul's star ascended in the movement, 
the literature shifted from an Ennis versus McPeck stance 
to a Paul versus McPeck stance. McPeck simply cannot be 
ignored.
I like to think of the three in a familial 
relationship. Ennis is the grandfather who founded a small 
family business. He founded it, nurtured it, and still 
plays a role in it. Paul is the dutiful son who joined 
the family business and who, with great zeal, built on 
its foundations to expand its market and improve its product 
line. He is the father of the business who has nurtured 
sons and daughters of his own to continue the families'
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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work. McPeck is the prodigal son who, with an equal amount 
of zeal, decided the foundations of the family business 
rested on shaky ground and needed to be torn down and remade 
in a similar, yet different, image. Since his family 
refused to allow him and his destructive tendencies into 
the heart of the family business, he built his own. His 
business is smaller, but offers stiff competition. The 
third generation may see the worth of both and be able 
to effect a merger, if one is at all possible, and if Uncle 
McPeck is incorrect in thinking that their business 
practices are incompatible. I hope to resolve, or at the 
very least come closer to a resolution of which business 
will fail or whether a merger is possible, before this 
inquiry is complete.
Challenging the Standard Approach 
Why focus on McPeck? Why not Ennis, Paul, Siegel, 
or Lipman? Why not try to get a handle on critical thinking 
by examining the standard approach, since it is the dominant 
account? It is precisely because the standard approach 
is the standard and dominant approach that I have decided 
not to go that route. A great deal has already been written 
from that viewpoint and being so immersed those writers 
do not always see where their biggest problems lie. It 
takes someone like McPeck, who is as interested in the 
topic as those taking the standard approach and who does 
not buy into it, to see the weaknesses. He puts it under
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the proverbial microscope and forces its proponents to 
face the weaknesses and try to deal with them. Even if 
McPeck's approach to critical thinking turns out to be 
wrong-headed, he has made a large contribution to the 
movement by forcing this confrontation. He has brought 
a refreshing vitality to the literature and to the critical 
thinking movement. A radical is, if nothing else, 
interesting.
Apart from being drawn by McPeck's radical position, 
the content of his ideas on critical thinking also entices 
me. What if he is correct in holding that critical thinking 
is subject or domain-specific? What if he is correct in 
saying that it cannot be taught as if one course nurtures 
skills applicable across subjects? The consequences are 
staggering. Every school that has set up a critical 
thinking program based on these mistaken assumptions wastes 
time and effort. The students waste time and effort 
attempting to inculcate skills and dispositions that will 
not make them proficient, critical reasoners. The teachers 
waste time preparing for and teaching something that is 
meant to be useful and turns out not to be when they could 
be teaching and preparing courses so that they are useful 
and do produce critical thinkers. All that waste from 
a misapprehension of the underlying nature of critical 
thinking!
Moreover, if it turns out that all the above is true 
and that McPeck's version of critical thinking eliminates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the opposition, the hardest part of McPeck's enterprise
would have to begin. He tells us that a liberal education
7
is the answer. Realistically that tells us nothing.
The teachers, researchers, or philosophers interested in 
critical thinking would have to determine what 'skills' 
count as critical in each subject/discipline/domain. 
Furthermore, they would still be left with the question 
of how to inculcate the commensurate 'skills', assuming 
of course that they decide critical thinking can be taught 
and is not acquired by osmosis nor. yet is inborn.
Finally and most importantly, I took up the challenge 
contained in a comment by Perry Weddle. In "McPeck's 
Critical Thinking and Education" he says, "What makes the 
emergence of an intellectual movement into adulthood might 
be said to be the movement's surviving its first major 
challenge. McPeck's Critical Thinking and Education is
Q
the challenge." I concur. McPeck did provide a great 
challenge to the critical thinking movement's standard 
approach. However, he speaks of McPeck's challenge as 
if it is over. The defenders of the movement supposedly 
faced the infidel and smote him. I doubt this very much. 
None of my research indicates that McPeck has ever been 
satisfactorily routed. While he has lost some battles, 
he has won too - the war rages on. This thesis constitutes 
one skirmish in this ongoing conflict.
The difference between my predecessors' (Paul, and 
Siegel among others) attempts to handle McPeck's arguments
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for his conception of critical thinking and my own resides 
in our different approaches. They address individual points 
that McPeck offers, in an effort to submarine his entire 
enterprise. What they succeed in sometimes doing is 
torpedoing those individual points but not the concept 
itself. I intend to address the sum of the arguments McPeck 
offers, the individual arguments as they perform in 
conjunction with each other— an overview if you will— and 
show that the consequences of his arguments lead to an 
interpretation of critical thinking that McPeck does not 
intend. In effect his arguments supporting his conception 
of critical thinking invalidates his conception of critical 
thinking. The project then is to analyze the McPeckian 
concept of critical thinking (italics mine). I shall 
contend that his arguments lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that there cannot be a concept of critical thinking but 
many, and it follows that his stated project crumbles 
because he claims to be analyzing an overriding concept, 
not a series of concepts whose natures may alter in given 
contexts.
Do not misunderstand me. McPeck offers many good 
points regarding the nature of critical thinking. These 
points emerge both when he is criticizing other views of 
the concept and when he is building the proper atmosphere 
for his own concept to function in adequately. The 
literature tends to overlook the positive aspects of 
McPeck's work in favour of highlighting the negative ones.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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When the good points are acknowledged, they are usually 
brushed over as if they are obvious and had been included 
from the beginning. Oftentimes, other contributors credit 
him only with stressing something that was purportedly 
embodied in their own constructions. By devaluing the 
points originality they devalue McPeck's importance as 
a contributor to the CTM. By acknowledging the justice 
of some of his points they appear to be taking his 
criticisms to heart and can largely ignore the more 
contentious criticisms.
In this thesis I intend to draw McPeck's conclusions 
and their consequences out into the open and show how and 
why they invalidate his own project. However, I will also 
spotlight the good points in his project, which show 
throughout Critical Thinking and Education, and show why 
they are good points and how they may serve as a base for 
a reformulation of his conception of critical thinking.
I am not interested in empirically verifying or disproving 
his theory by citing study after study - both sides do 
this and it has taken theorists nowhere. One of the issues 
McPeck addresses is the validity of such studies based 
on critical thinking tests. One problem he mentions is 
that it is unclear what is actually being tested for - 
critical thinking skills, reading skills, or intelligence?
This thesis will be presented in three interlocking 
sections. The second chapter deals with the first two 
chapters of Critical Thinking and Education where McPeck
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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develops his concept of critical thinking and the conditions 
under which it operates. We cannot understand why he 
invalidates his own concept if we do not know what he 
conceives critical thinking to be and why. The third 
chapter builds on the second, outlining where his 
conclusions lead him astray and how they invalidate his 
own project. The last chapter highlights the positive 
aspects in McPeck's arguments and offers an overall 
assessment of his analysis, arguing that he has failed 
in his goal to provide the analysts of critical thinking, 
and asking what caused this failure, and what he can do 
about it - if anything.
This thesis covers McPeck's contributions from 1981, 
when Critical Thinking and Education was released, to the 
present day. His latest book, Teaching Critical Thinking 
is included. However, my thesis will not comment on Chapter 
5 of Critical Thinking and Education which focuses on Edward 
de Bono.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE MEANING OF 'CRITICAL THINKING1
John McPeck wrote Critical Thinking and Education 
out of a need to present a clear analysis of the concept 
of critical thinking. We do not, he claims, have a clear 
understanding of what the concept of critical thinking 
entails.
The phrase 'critical thinking' is both 
overworked and under-analyzed . . . Even 
the more careful work that has been done 
on critical thinking tends to rush over 
the analysis of the basic concept and to 
move on to itemizing the various skills 
that it is thought to involve.
As a consequence, critical thinking can legitimately refer
to anything from logic to the ability to solve clever puzzle
games and can, so it is claimed, be inculcated in any one
of a number of ways. Providing a list of skills as Ennis
does in his definitions is not enough since he nowhere
2
provides a justification for his view. McPeck intends 
to make up for this lack by providing the missing analysis.
McPeck dismisses the approach to critical thinking 
typified by Robert Ennis, what I call the standard approachf 
in which typically a definition, meant to apply to all 
disciplines, is given along with a list of skills and/or 
dispositions. Edward D'Angelo, for example, also employs
12
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this pattern of explanation in The Teaching of Critical 
Thinking.^ Even those, like Paul and Siegel, who do not 
follow this precise pattern, assume the concept applies 
to other disciplines and assume that a definition applicable 
across disciplines is possible. It is this common 
assumption that identifies a theory as a standard approach 
theory.
McPeck takes the opposite approach, arguing, as we 
shall see, that the concept of critical thinking does not 
exist as a discipline unto itself and that a list of generic 
skills and/or dispositions is unworkable. The two 
approaches are, however, intertwined in his book. In his 
illustration of the concept, McPeck depends less upon a 
positive analysis of the concept than on a negative one.
That is to say, the structure of Critical Thinking and 
Education mainly revolves around his stating what is 
misguided about the ‘standard approach' and why, and then 
providing the correct approach. We might view McPeck's 
concept as the antithesis of the standard approach, since 
it rejects the standard account's basic assumptions. This 
rejection will be clarified.
His conception of critical thinking rests on two basic 
assumptions that act as the foundation of his theory.
The first assumption is that a concept of critical thinking 
exists. He is not seeking to establish that fact. McPeck's 
concern is with its nature. Is critical thinking 
subject-specific or not? If it is, how does it manifest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4
itself? How do we recognize and use it? We have already 
met the second assumption (p. 12) which says the standard 
approach to critical thinking has not discovered how this 
manifestation occurs.
The first two chapters of the book called "The Meaning 
of Critical Thinking" and "Critical Thinking, Epistemology, 
and Education," are devoted to the articulation of the 
theoretical assumptions that comprise the actual foundation 
and structure of his analysis. Throughout these two 
chapters, McPeck offers the conditions necessary for 
critical thinking to flourish, and a step-by-step argument 
leading to the conclusion that critical thinking is. 
conceptually linked to epistemology. He reaches this 
conclusion by a three-premise main argument, each premise 
of which is backed by a chain of supporting arguments.
The three main premises support the conclusion that critical 
thinking is conceptually linked to epistemology. The main 
argument is: (1) thinking is always about something in 
particular, (2) there is no generalized set of skill(s) 
called critical thinking, (3) critical thinking is 
subject-specific, and therefore (C) critical thinking is 
conceptually linked to epistemology. We will examine this 
reasoning in Sections I and II of this chapter.
McPeck provides two definitions that rest on the above 
reasoning. They do not provide content to the concept, 
but indicate how the concept is to be applied. They show 
how the concept functions. In addition to the definitions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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McPeck also provides ten features that outline the 
conditions under which the definitions must operate. They 
establish limits or boundaries both for the concept itself 
and for the definitions that arise from the concept. I 
will argue that McPeck's own concept is fundamentally 
incoherent, but before I can do that, I need first to 
explain that conception/analysis. That explanation entails 
examining the premises the conception, the definitions, 
and the features - all of which comprise the conception.
(I) The Relationship Between Generalized Skills 
and Critical Thinking 
First, we will look at the three premises and the 
conclusion that I set out in the beginning of this chapter. 
To simplify the discussion of these premises we will examine 
the first two premises in Section I of this chapter and 
the third premise and the conclusion in the following 
Section.
Premises 1 and 2 
The arguments underlying premise (1) arise because
McPeck wants to show why the standard approach fails and
mistakenly reifies critical thinking into a curriculum
subject. The tenets of this argument run through much
of his work outside of Critical Thinking and Education;
namely, "The Evaluation of Critical Thinking Programs;
Dangers and Dogmas," "Response to H. Siegel," "Critical
Thinking and the 'Trivial Pursuit' Theory of Knowledge,"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and "Paul's Critique of Critical Thinking and Education."
The basic argument runs: thinking is always about 
something in particular; to think of no particular thing 
is equivalent to not thinking at all. "it is a matter 
of conceptual truth that thinking is always thinking about 
X; and that X can never be 'everything in general' but 
must always be something in particular."^ This line of 
reasoning raises serious concerns about teachers' claims 
that they teach thinking, that they teach students to think, 
or that they teach thinking in general; and yet critical 
thinking is reified into a curriculum subject.
The standard approach fails because, as we shall see 
in feature 7, theorists mistakenly emphasize 'critical' 
as if critical thinking alters the nature and operation 
of thinking; whereas, it really behaves like the term 
'creative' which qualifies thinking and which, in itself,
5
does not describe what is being thought about.
'Precocious', 'imaginative', and 'sensitive' operate in
the same fashion.
If thinking is always about something . . . then 
'critical thinking' per se is even more so, that 
is, more transitive. This is because critical 
thinking as such, is a kind of higher-order 
thinking about things . . . and is, therefore, 
parasitic upon the original thing being thought 
about.
When we drop the X we are left with "I teach 
precocity," "I teach imagination," or "I teach creativity." 
If it is argued that they are general skills, they must 
be concomitants of other pursuits.
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since they are related to the way in which 
something is done, not what is done 
. . . Adding, the adjective 'critical' to 
the phrase 'thinking about X' describes 
in some general way how something is thought 
about, but it does not describe that 
something. In isolation from a particular 
subject, the phrase 'critical thinking1 
neither refers to nor denotes any particular 
skill . . .  it makes no sense to talk about 
critical thinking as a distinct subject 
and that it therefore cannot be profitably 
taught as such.
Since, McPeck concludes, critical thinking is not about
a specific X, and since critical thiking does no belong
to a distinct subject, it does not-make sense to say "I
teach critical thinking" because there is no generalized
g
skill properly called critical thinking. Thinking and
critical thinking are bound to particular subjects and
activities. The standard approach, which subscribes to
the notion of critical thinking simpliciter, is absurd
"because there are almost as many ways of thinking as there
are things to think about."
The argument that there is no such thing as thinking
in general and that thinking must be about some thing in
particular is one of the most contentious arguments that
McPeck presents. In "Critical Thinking: How to Teach Good
Reasoning" Groarke and Tindale state that
People know how to think, perhaps, but they 
do not understand the principles of thinking.
When they do, they will, we believe reason 
more effectively . . . reasoning [which 
Groarke and Tindale use interchangeably 
with critical thinking] is, for us, like 
writing skills. Undergraduates can all, 
presumably, write. But many of ^ e m  need 
to develop their writing skills.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Many counter-arguments theorists offer share one trait
- they depend on analogies to some other, presumably
general, 'activities' where courses exist to improve the
requisite skills. Harvey Siegel's counter-argument provides
an example of how many theorists broach the subject and
where the disputants, McPeck and the standard approach
theorists, get derailed. Siegel points out:
A given act of thinking may, as McPeck 
suggests, always be about something or other; 
it may make no sense to say of a given 
episode of thinking that the .thinker was 
thinking, but not about anything in 
particular. But it hardly follows from 
this that thinking, conceived as a general 
sort of activity which includes as instances 
all cases of particular acts of thinking 
about something —  and such a conception 
must be possible, on pain of inability to 
identify all the specific acts as acts of 
thinking —  must itself be construed as 
about something or other. It is not the 
case that the general activity of thinking 
is 'logically connected to an X' any more 
than the general activity of cycling is 
logically.! connected to any particular 
bicycle.
In his "Response to H. Siegel," McPeck challenges 
the legitimacy of Siegel's analogy linking cycling with 
thinking. Cycling denotes a specific ability and has a 
limited set of criteria for effectiveness. It is not a 
general activity except insofar as you can travel to 
different places for different purposes. Thinking does 
not denote a specific ability nor does it have a finite 
set of criteria for effectiveness. As McPeck has said 
elsewhere, there can be critical, creative, imaginative,
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sensitive, etc. thinking, each of which, presumably, has 
its own set of criteria.
Different destinations and purposes do not 
change the specific nature of the skill 
of cycling. But different problems and 
purposes do change the inherent nature of 
the skills required in thinking. No one 
set of skills can encompass 'thinking', 
but one ^gt of skills does encompass 
cycling.
McPeck's rejection of Siegel's analogy between cycling 
and thinking seems valid and for the given reasons.
However, I think both have lost sight of the fact that 
we are concerned with critical thinking, not thinking in 
general.
Siegel, who believes that there are some skills linked
to critical thinking, such as identifying assumptions and
identifying fallacies, could admit that McPeck's charges
are telling ones, but not if he compares cycling with
critical thinking. In Siegel's view the skills of critical
thinking have a limited, not an infinite, set of criteria
for effectiveness. To be effective the criteria would
allow for minor adaptations to fit different situations,
but for effective cycling we need to make adjustments when
faced with different types of bicycles in different types 
1 *3of terrain. Critical thinking skills would behave 
slightly differently in history than in religion; a 'normal' 
bicycle would behave differently on a dirt road than on 
a paved one. Riding a mountain bike in rough terrain is
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different from riding a 10-speed on city streets. And 
so Siegel's analogy and criticism of McPeck's argument 
is valid when cycling, a specific ability with a limited 
set of criteria for effectiveness, is compared to critical 
thinking, a specific type of thinking with a limited set 
of criteria for effectiveness.
McPeck and the standard theorists are operating from 
two different intuitions, if you will, regarding the nature 
of critical thinking. Or, as Selman puts it, "The dispute 
seems to be the result of a failure to come to agreement 
on a satisfactory way of conceptualizing the nature of 
critical thinking and the concepts associated with it."1'* 
McPeck's intuition tells him that critical thinking is 
not a particular way of thinking with its own subject matter 
and criteria, 'critical' is only used as a qualifier to 
describe the type of thinking that is occurring. Standard 
theorists1 intuitions tell them 'critical' does not just 
qualify thinking; critical thinking is a particular type 
of thinking with criteria of its own and it can be taught 
as a separate subject; therefore, they conclude, McPeck 
must be mistaken in his assertion that thinking in general 
and critical thinking in particular must be about some 
X.
McPeck's argument that there is no thinking in general 
leads to the conclusion there is no generalized set of 
skills called critical thinking. We can easily see how 
he comes to that conclusion. If thinking is always aimed
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at some X, then critical thinking, which is a particular
way of thinking, is also aimed at some X. 'Critical'
describes how something is thought about; it does not
describe that something. Since critical thinking is not
a something in itself and is dependent on particular X's
for its substance, it is not a generalized skill with its
own subject matter and criteria for its use.
Ennis disagrees with this conclusion on the grounds
that there are bridge-jumping general criteria such as
assumption identification, and detecting and avoiding
equivocation, etc. which do not depend on the subject.
However, it does not seem to me that McPeck would accept
Ennis's examples of bridge-jumping general criteria. First,
what counts as an assumption, for example, depends on the
subject or field to which X belongs. Second, to even find
an assumption you need a thorough working knowledge of
the field. Without a thorough working knowledge you would
not know what constitutes an assumption in the field and
if you had some general definition for that field you would
not necessarily know how to apply it unless you understood
what makes something an assumption in that field and why
this particular claim constitutes an assumption. A certain
1 6amount of background understanding is implied. General
prescriptions are unhelpful if you lack this necessary
knowledge. McPeck continues by arguing that as we move
from the purely formal to the empirical mode a universal
1 7
standard becomes dimmer.
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McPeck offers some comments to show that there is
no empirical evidence to support critical thinking as a
generalized skill. Most texts based on the standard view
focus on logic and fallacies with the rationale that by
gaining skill in their proper use students will know the
rudiments of critical thinking. This view assumes a
transfer of training across disciplinary boundaries. There
is evidence to the contrary. McPeck refers us to Bryce
1 8B. Hudgins in Learning and Thinking. In "Trivial Pursuit"
McPeck claims that almost all empirical studies on transfer
of training effects, particularly in the cognitive domain,
1 9have been unpromising (italics mine). In my own review
of material on transfer of training, I have seen studies
20which claim that transfer does occur. While I cannot 
agree there is no empirical evidence supporting critical 
thinking as a generalized skill, I can concede that there 
is no definitive evidence either way.
McPeck has more to say on the subject of transfer 
in "Stalking Beasts." He warns that we should not confuse 
'logical subsumption1 with 'psychological transfer'.
Simply because logical principles might apply does not 
mean psychological transfer takes place between domains 
and principles. Some kinds of specific knowledge and 
information will have greater transfer capacity, i.e. 
"politicians are sensitive to voting pressures" versus 
"the cat is on the mat."21 The real question is what 
knowledge and information will have the most capacity for
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transfer.
Thus, McPeck believes that he has offered empirical 
as well as theoretical proof that critical thinking cannot 
be a generalized skill; although, with the proliferation 
of transfer of training studies supporting the opposite 
point of view, we need not necessarily accept this 
conclusion. What is more, by seemingly eliminating transfer 
of training across disciplinary boundaries McPeck reinforces 
his own assurance that the standard theorists are misguided.
The mistaken assumption, as McPeck sees it, that 
critical thinking is a generalized skill has practical 
consequences. Critical thinking tests are based on this 
misguided notion. Since the idea is false, so must the 
tests be. Critical thinking as a generalized skill does 
not exist but it supposedly is what is being tested for. 
Since critical thinking as a generalized skill does not 
exist, then critical thinking is not being tested for.
As McPeck points out in "Dangers and Dogmas," the burden 
of proof traditionally rests on the person who makes an 
existence claim. Those who set up tests to measure 
'critical reasoning ability' or 'general reasoning skills' 
behave as if the former have actually been proven to exist. 
The above mentioned tests, he claims, do two things: (1) 
they assume the phenomena being tested for are useful 
to/productive of critical thinking, thereby, assuming what 
needs to be proven; and (2) because abilities are 
postulated, they assume the unitary underlying abilities
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exist "reifying the existence of a pervasive 'ability'
22from its description."
(II) The Relationship Between Subject-Specificity,
Epistemology and Critical Thinking
Since we have established the link between premise
(1) (thinking is always about something in particular)
and premise (2) (there is no generalized set of skills
called critical thinking) the next step is to establish
the link between the former premises, premise (3), critical
thinking is subject-specific, and the conclusion that
critical thinking is conceptually linked to epistemology.
The progression from premise (2) to premise (3) is a natural
one; especially given the quote on page 5 of Critical
Thinking and Education which states that "it does not make
sense to talk about critical thinking as a distinct subject
23and that it therefore cannot be taught as such." If 
critical thinking is not a distinct subject and if it can, 
nevertheless, be taught, then it must be taught as integral 
to other subjects.
McPeck does not deny critical thinking involves 
reasoning skills; what he denies is that critical thinking 
is a skill or that there is a generalized set of skills 
that can be made to be distinct from other subjects.
Insofar as critical thinking is a skill, it is teachable 
as other skills are. One thing is certain, since there 
is no universally applicable skill or discipline comprising
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critical thinking, it should be taught as adjunct to other
subjects and the problems and exercises should be set up
with this in mind.
Indeed, the very idea of teaching critical 
thinking in isolation from specific content 
is incoherent . . . Moreover, it is crucial 
to recognize that the specific ingredients 
of critical thinking will differ according 
to task or subject, and that it comprises 
neither any specific set of skills nor 
'logical' skills.
McPeck uses Toulmin to support his judgment that
critical thinking is subject-specific. Toulmin, for
example, states that "all the canons for the criticism
and assessment of arguments, I conclude, are in practice
field-dependent, while all our terms of assessment are
25field-invariant in their force."
From this statement and from the rest of his argument
I must conclude (with Govier) that Toulmin can be read
2 6as supporting both sides of the dispute. She cites An
Introduction to Reasoning, a book Toulmin co-authored,
which insists every argument be located in some one field
and in which he also superimposes a general account.
Subsequent reviews, she says, reveal that Toulmin has
problems fitting natural argument into one discipline
because some arguments combine themes from several
disciplines and some topics are not clearly claimed by
27one discipline. It would be like trying to force a square 
peg into a round hole. You would have to shave off a lot 
of the peg to make it fit the hole; thereby making the
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peg into something it is not. Attempting to put a natural 
argument into one discipline when it belongs to several 
also means losing much of its identity. If Govier is right, 
then Toulmin does not provide adequate support for the 
view that critical thinking is subject-specific and, with 
its superimposed general account, may not have intended 
it to be so limited.
McPeck goes one step further by claiming that Hamblin,
whose work Fallacies Johnson and Blair, among others, claim
lays the groundwork for the development of a theory of
fallacy, actually rejects a general theory of fallacy.
According to McPeck, Hamblin supports his own claim .that
instances of fallacies or valid arguments are not
2 8universally applicable across subject areas. To 
understand how the former point about informal logic relates 
to critical thinking, we must realize that for McPeck 
informal logic, like critical thinking, mistakenly asserts 
that there are skills or criteria that cross subject or 
disciplinary boundaries. Hence, McPeck takes Hamblin's 
position as not only rejecting informal logic, but also 
accepting his own position on the subject-specific nature 
of knowledge.
McPeck highlights three theses in Fallacies that 
support his former contention. The first is that the 
foundation of fallacies rests on epistemic, not logical, 
considerations (72 - 77). The second is that when assessing 
statements, acceptance, which is relative to varying
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circumstances, should take precedence over validity and 
truth (242 - 245). The third is that rules and conventions 
of argument are determined by the context and belief states 
of interlocutors (283 - 284).^
However, the theses do not provide the support McPeck 
thinks they do. The first thesis is unobjectionable to 
informal logicians, as is the second. McPeck's employment 
of them against informal logic rests on his mistaken belief 
that informal logic denigrates knowledge. It rests on 
the mistaken belief that informal logic is concerned only 
with validity. However, the third thesis is not in tune 
even with McPeck who has said in his two definitions of 
critical thinking, which we will examine in Section III, 
that we must question belief foundations.
Ignoring the problems we have found with McPeck1s
supporters, Toulmin and Hamblin, what the argument boils
down to for McPeck is that "in general, different domains
of knowledge have (more often than not) characteristically
different patterns of reasoning and argument that are
3 0peculiar to themselves." The differences among kinds 
of reasoning are greater than what is common. An historian 
argues in a way that is different from a mathematician, 
an engineer, an anthropologist, etc., according to McPeck.
He uses 'mass' as an example of what he means about 
differences between subjects. The word 'mass' has different 
connotations and denotations in physics and Marxist 
political theory, yet it is the same word. He claims we
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need to understand the surrounding concepts and evidence
31which also "may be peculiar to that field" (italics mine) 
to gain an adequate understanding of, in this instance, 
the word's connotations and denotations in a given field.
With premise (3) established, i.e. critical thinking 
is subject-specific, we must see how it relates to the 
conclusion. We must realize that as a philosopher of 
education McPeck is concerned with how critical thinking 
is to be imparted to students. The answer to this question 
resides in the conclusion to which'the premises lead; 
namely, that critical thinking is conceptually linked to 
epistemology. The relation between the two not only 
completes the description of critical thinking's nature, 
but also tells us that to think critically in a subject 
we must study the epistemology of the subject.
McPeck begins establishing this conceptual link in 
Chapter Two by stating that uncritical students are not 
uncritical because they suffer from a deficiency in logic, 
as theorists in the standard sense of critical thinking 
seem to believe, but because they lack education in the 
traditional sense. These students do not have a clear 
understanding of what constitutes good reasons for belief 
in the domains in which they are immersed. An 
epistemological approach provides this understanding.
"in short, there is both a conceptual and pedagogic link 
between epistemology, critical thinking and education, 
but the study of logic or critical thinking as such has
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He concludes that a person must participate in the
particular domain of inquiry to "appreciate the proper
significance of the evidence. Indeed, the domain of inquiry
from which the evidence comes might be one in which familiar
33canons of logic do not apply." For example, they may 
not apply in art, religion, morals, quantum physics, 
economics, or law.
Some standard theorists claim that their approaches 
are valuable because they teach pebple to deal with real 
issues. However, there are two reasons why standard 
theorists cannot legitimately refer to their approaches' 
efficacy in dealing with real issues. First, we generally 
operate in unfamiliar territory where one question generates 
others, where epistemological uncertainties abound and 
experts disagree. Real issues do not depend on logical 
validity, but on the truth of the premises. "The most 
striking problem with these unfamiliar realms of expertise 
is that they presuppose a knowledge of technical language 
and an epistemological framework that the uninitiated cannot 
possess.1,34
Second, introductory logic texts claim to be most
useful in dealing with real issues in everyday life by
using editorials, letters to the editor, media accounts,
etc. McPeck describes this approach as "superficial opinion
masquerading as profound insight into complex public 
35issues." He stresses that exercises based upon this
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approach are contrived because all the relevant information 
is given and the truth of the premises are assumed. Things 
are not that clear-cut in real life.
The main complaint McPeck directs at standard theorists 
of critical thinking and informal logicians is that they 
miss that real life is not clear-cut and hence they 
underestimate the complexity of the different kinds of 
information and overestimate the role of logic in 
assessment. In "Critical Thinking Without Logic" he states 
that standard theorists treat information as if it is 'mere 
information' that can be found in any encyclopedia: it 
is unambiguous and uncomplicated. P and Q function as 
placeholders for statements and information which can then 
be manipulated with logical rules. "The major requirements 
for such an assessment are epistemological, not logical, 
in character."36
McPeck makes a good point when he suggests that we
should be wary of systems that ignore the complexity and
ambiguous nature of information and knowledge and
concentrate on the form that knowledge plugs into. Such
a system would have limited practical use since most
information is acknowledged to be complex, often ambiguous,
and evolving. However, I also agree with Govier who says
in her review of Critical Thinking and Education that,
"No serious logician has ever thought that logic itself
could provide all the knowledge needed to evaluate an
37argument on a specific topic." And so, although McPeck
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makes some good points, we need to be aware that the
criticisms he makes against the standard theorists are
not apt because he seriously misinterprets their position.
McPeck's assurance that critical thinking is
conceptually linked to epistemology is all very well, but
thus far we do not know precisely what that means because
we have no idea about what McPeck means by epistemology.
McPeck characterizes epistemology as the
Analyses of good reasons for various beliefs.
Ideally, epistemology attempts to provide 
the very best reasons for holding a belief, 
and to this extent its purpose is identical 
with that of rationality . . .  it includes 
understanding concepts and the peculiarities 
of the nature of evidence, as they are 
understood by practitionegs in the field 
from which they emanate.
We find that he adds a number of provisos to the term
'epistemology1. First, he points out that the best reasons
need not entail logical certainty, there are other, less
stringent, criteria. Second, and most importantly,
Just as there are different kinds of 
knowledge, so there are different kinds 
of reasons, evidence, and modes of justifying 
them. What might be a good reason for one 
kind of belief could be an extremely bad 
type of^reason to support another kind of 
belief.
Third, a minimal condition for understanding a good 
reason in any field means understanding the full meaning 
of the specialized, often technical language, in which 
reasons are expressed. Critical thinking is epistemological 
in character because it is concerned with the meanings 
°f statements (semantics) rather than logical relations
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for example, that is expressed as P-^Q it is far more
important and more complex to understand what P or Q mean
than to understand the syntactic relation between P and
Q (expressed by the symbol—
Finally, epistemology is concerned with gaining an
education and with gaining knowledge in various fields.
Critical thinking is conceptually linked with epistemology
therefore, "Critical thinking is a necessary condition
of education.1,42 Education entails the acquisition of
knowledge, but an analysis of knowledge shows that the
knower must be in possession of an justification of what
is putatively known. A common criticism of schools today
is that students learn by rote acquiring facts without 
• j 43evidence. Presumably McPeck wishes to place critical
thinking in the process of justification.
Justification, he says, has two dimensions: (1)
assessing the veracity and internal validity of evidence
as presented, and (2) judging whether the belief with its
evidence is compatible with an existing belief system.
The process of assessing, fitting, and adjusting makes
a belief 'belong* to a person rather than it being a
proposition he has heard about. McPeck characterizes
knowledge as,
S knows P 
if and only if:
(i) S believes P,
(ii) S has adequate evidence of P,
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(iii) The evidence constitutes S's 
reason for believing.P, 
and (iv) P is true.
Before making a judgment about P, S must suspend his belief
about P in order to assess the internal coherence of the
evidence and to integrate P into his belief system.
But to say that a temporary suspension of judgment 
is required for justifying one's beliefs is simply 
another way of saying that one must be self-critical 
or possess a critical mind with respect to P in order 
to produce a justification. Thus the integration 
and internalization of beliefs and evidence require 
critical thinking. Moreover, critical thinking, as 
I have argued, involves just such a suspension of 
belief.
Critical thinking fits into steps (ii) and (iii) of McPeck's 
characterization of knowledge acquisition.
No one can be 'truly educated' in McPeck's sense of 
'education' without understanding the epistemology of a 
subject. To understand the epistemology of a subject, 
to be educated in a subject, to have acquired knowledge 
in the subject involves coming to hold the best reasons 
for a belief. Holding the best reasons for a belief, which 
in turn depends on critical thinking to provide a 
justification for the belief.
McPeck compares the differences between the standard 
aPproach to critical thinking or education and his own 
approach with comparisons to reading research between the 
basic skills approach and the reading comprehension approach 
m  order to clarify what is happening between the two we 
a*"e interested in. The basic skills approach "appears
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to regard reading ability as the possession of certain
4 6symbolic ‘decoding and pronunciation* skills.11 It is 
logically possible for someone to be a good decoder without 
being able to read. McPeck offers the example of an 
individual who speaks English and who has learned to 
recognize and pronounce written German. That person 
successfully decodes the text, but we would not claim he 
is reading because he received no message from the symbols. 
He does not understand what the symbols mean.
In the comprehension approach "the cognitive 
prerequisites for reading comprehension are fundamental 
to the reading process, and, since comprehension involves 
understanding information, concepts, and various 
implications of these, the 'basic skills* view is overly 
simplistic.
An examination of the research on critical thinking
indicates to McPeck that it suffers from the same ailment
as research on reading.
Critical thinking, after all, likewise 
entails the appropriate processing of 
information and the making of inferences 
with respect to that information, but as 
with reading comprehension, critical thinking 
cannot be reduced to a few mechanical 
'decoding* skills.
We become mired in what McPeck calls in "Is Reading," the
process/content debate, i.e. are the necessary competencies
generalizable skills or acquired information? By bringing
reading into McPeck*s favourite issue we can easily guess
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which side will win. Process always takes a backseat to 
content.
Critical thinking, like reading, depends on 
understanding. McPeck1s epistemological approach to 
critical thinking succeeds, in his estimation, because 
it alone provides the understanding necessary to think 
critically about anything. With the link between critical 
thinking and epistemology established, we will look to 
the definitions which gain their mandate from the above 
argument.
(Ill) McPeck1s Definitions of Critical Thinking
We have examined the basic premises McPeck rests his
conception of critical thinking on. We shall now look
at the two definitions of critical thinking that arise
from these premises. These definitions do not depend upon
the features and nature of critical thinking for their
content. The link between critical thinking and
epistemology does not affect the definitions. As a matter
of fact the first definition, "the propensity and skill
.49to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism, 
is not very different from the definition commonly 
attributed to Ennis. Ennis claims critical thinking is 
"reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding 
what to believe or do."*^ Both connect critical thinking 
with some form of reflective thinking and both focus on 
a process ('engaging in' and 'deciding'). On the face
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of it neither definition is inherently superior to the
other; however, we need to see that the definitions McPeck
offers do not differentiate his conception of critical
thinking from an acceptable standard approach version.
The difference between McPeck and the standard approach
is the argument outlined in Sections I and II which says
critical thinking is subject-specific and conceptually
linked to epistemology.
The two approaches are differentiated by the conceptual
assumptions (as seen in Sections I and II) that they rest
on. McPeck1s definition, for example, functions within
specific subjects rather than across them. To have' the
'skill' he refers to, a person would have to be immersed
in the subject to know what 'skill(s)1 to bring to bear
on a problem. Which 'skill(s)1 remain undefined, because
different subjects and different problems will require
different skills.
The types of skill to which I am drawing attention 
are those that have identifiable intellectual 
components, such as the use or partial use of 
various methods (research methods, statistical 
methods, programming methods), strategies (for 
solving problems, winning battles or games, 
attacking mountains) and techniques 
(crystallography versus spectrometry,) models 
versus pictures, telling versus showing . . .
Not all skills permit the use of critical 
thinking.
Unfortunately, this necessary vagueness in identifying 
critical skills causes problems. McPeck has not provided 
any criteria to decide which critical thinking skills to
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use. Perhaps it would take critical thinking skills to 
tell which critical thinking skills are necessary in any 
given situation, and that would lead us to believe the 
critical thinker would already know what they are. Perhaps 
we could look at an activity and say "Those are critical 
thinking skills"; or more than likely for McPeck, which 
skills are used would depend on the circumstances, and 
that again amounts to the original conjecture that we ought 
to know what they are.
As I said, because critical thinking is 
subject-specific what comprises critical thinking skills 
necessarily remains undefined. What is considered ' 
'critical1 in one subject may not be so in another subject. 
What is critical in one subject is not necessarily critical 
in another. Realizing this, however, does not invalidate 
my concern that McPeck gives us no way to identify which 
skills count as critical at any ..particular place and time. 
The definition is meant to facilitate the use of the 
conception, to specifically detail what critical thinking 
is and direct us in using it; however, because the 
definition does not supply this identification, McPeck's 
conception— at least, so defined— is unworkable. This 
lack is of major concern since critical thinking is meant 
to be instrumental. If we cannot identify what critical 
skills are required at any given time and if we are not 
provided with a way to decide, then the conception McPeck
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offers lacks instrumentality. This failure only voids
the definition; it does not affect the conception itself.
The use of 'propensity' in the definition refers to
the attitudes, habits of mind, or character traits (although
McPeck does not like this last term) of a critical thinker
as opposed to critical thinking itself. However, apart
from saying teachers must inculcate this undefined
propensity in their students, McPeck does not describe
what 'propensity* entails. All we are told is that both
propensity and skill are necessary for a critical thinker.
If the propensity carries over to an area where an
individual lacks skill, then it is likely to be 
52embarrassing because he does not have the relevant 
knowledge to satisfy his proclivities. It would be like 
the comic Norm Crosby who uses large words in places and 
ways they do not belong. He has the propensity, lacks 
the skill, and gets a laugh. That kind of mistake in 'real 
life' would prove to be embarrassing and indicate a lack 
of success.
The term "reflective skepticism" is unclear. Under
normal conditions we might be able to say what the
individual words mean, but McPeck coins his own
interpretation. For him 'skepticism' refers to a healthy
advance towards the resolution of a problem. "Skepticism
or suspension of assent towards a given statement,
53established norm or mode of doing things" allows for
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alternative hypotheses and possibilities. McPeck's 
characterization rules out the negative baggage that 
traditionally accompanies 'skepticism' which has a 
connotation of doubting for doubt's sake. McPeck, however, 
states that his type of 'skepticism' does not allow 
pervasive or unjustified questioning. 'Reflection' comes 
into play when a critical thinker attempts to determine 
when to bring his skills to bear and what to ask.
Prom the above explanations he concludes that "no 
one can think critically about everything, as there are
54no Renaissance men in this age of specialized knowledge." 
Renaissance men apparently knew a great deal about a lot, 
and this is no longer possible. Subjects today are too 
complex for us to become as well-rounded as Renaissance 
men.
Apart from the above considerations regarding the 
terms and stipulations McPeck employs, a number of people 
have expressed other concerns regarding McPeck's first 
definition. In Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical 
Thinking and Education, Siegel exposes a problem in the 
alliance between reflective skepticism and critical 
thinking. He charges that the term "reflective skepticism" 
is unhelpful and the definition is circular. A skeptic 
could be reflective and the skepticism unjustified; 
alternatively, someone could be skeptical and not 
reflective.55
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I think it is important to point out that Siegel's 
criticism thus far does not carry much weight, because 
he ignores the fact that McPeck stipulated what he means 
by 'skepticism'. As we have seen, McPeck's version does 
not allow for unjustified skepticism. The norms of the 
subject area determine when we should start questioning, 
i.e. what we should question, and why we should question 
it. Our skepticism would always be justified. Moreover, 
McPeck might also reply that someone might be reflective 
and unskeptical but that this would mean, by his definition, 
that that person is not a critical thinker. A critical 
thinker is both reflective and skeptical. To be reflective 
without being skeptical or to be skeptical without being 
reflective means that that person does not meet the 
conditions of a critical thinker.
Siegel continues by saying that the question could 
not be settled by appropriateness, which is determined 
by the criteria of the problem area, because often we are 
to be reflectively skeptical about the criteria. We would 
need to use critical thinking to determine if an instance 
of reflective skepticism is justified. "Hence justified 
reflective skepticism assumes critical thinking; 
consequently, it cannot in turn explicate or define critical 
thinking."56
This last criticism is similar to the one I presented 
about needing critical thinking skills to determine which
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critical thinking skills to bring to bear on a problem 
(p. 36 - 37). We are caught in an infinite loop. Critical 
skills are necessary to decide when and what critical skills 
to bring to bear on a problem; yet, we do not know how 
to acquire the first set of skills in order to decide on 
the second set. Reflective skepticism assumes critical 
thinking, so we cannot use reflective skepticism to explain 
critical thinking. Both, to use an informal logic fallacy, 
improperly beg the question.
Siegel seems to be saying that critical thinking is
needed to determine when critical thinking is needed to
determine when critical thinking is needed, and that-
referring to the norms of a subject area will not work
because sometimes the norms are the very things that need
to be questioned. This suggestion sounds solid and
attractive; however, for McPeck, critical thinking is
5 7brought to bear when rational thinking fails. That is 
to say, when we hit a problematic juncture in our reasoning, 
then critical thinking would be brought to bear on that 
problematic juncture (and I imagine that we supposedly 
know when that happened whether it occurred in the course 
of normal reasoning in the subject area or when the norms 
failed).
This suggestion also sounds good. It would sound 
better if McPeck had not stressed, in both his discussion 
°f rationality and in his discussion of reflective
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skepticism, that referring to the norms of the subject
area is essential to determine when to use judicious
i i. • • 58skepticism.
I can understand why Siegel has a problem with McPeck1 
definition. Assessing the norms or standards of a subject 
area is certainly important. Critical thinking would be 
of little use if it could not question the norms in use 
in any subject. Were that the case, where would the 
advances in science, history, et. al. come from if the 
norms in the field could not be questioned, let alone 
altered? Yet I wonder what an acceptable definition of 
critical thinking would look like if it includes using 
the norms of a subject as well as questioning those same 
norms. Some outside criteria would need to be applied 
to determine when it is reasonable simply to use the given 
norms and when to question those same norms. It begins 
to sound as if McPeck's opponents are correct in claiming 
that critical thinking is a subject unto itself. Thought 
°f in this way, the standards of critical thinking would 
answer these difficult questions. That way critical 
thinking would not be embedded in the very norms it was 
meant to question.
Frederick Oscanyan and Perry Weddle individually focus 
on the question whether it is reasonable or not to connect 
critical and reflective thinking. Oscanyan highlights 
the difference, as he sees it, between the two, and thus,
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his criticism can be directed against Ennis as well. Weddle 
pinpoints trouble surrounding "reflective skepticism" when 
put into practice. I will look first at Oscanyan, then 
Weddle.
In "Critical Thinking in California: Response to Brooke
Moore" Oscanyan states:
Reflective thinking differs from critical thinking 
in its appreciation of the variety of mental 
acts and styles of thought, its sense of when 
criteria for evaluating mental acts are needed, 
and its willingness to suspect that criteria 
for evaluating mental acts are needed, and its 
willingness to suspect that the criteria it has 
got are not the only ones there can be. „
Reflective thinking is thinking about thinking.
Apart from its limitation to mental acts, I cannot discern
a real conflict between reflective thinking and the way
McPeck wants critical thinking to work. Add 'activities'
to 'mental acts' and the two types of thinking would seem
to be indistinguishable.
Whether Oscanyan's characterization of reflective
thinking is correct or not, he is right in mentioning that
there is presumably a difference between reflective thinking
and critical thinking. If all we wanted were reflective
thinkers, then why not say so instead of arguing for years
about critical thinkers and critical thinking? According
to Ennis critical thinking is "reasonable reflective
thinking." According to McPeck critical thinking is
"engaging in an activity with reflective skepticism" where
the meaning of 'skepticism' is so stipulated as to remove
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its negative baggage. If so many people agree critical 
thinking is reflective thinking then the answer as to what 
constitutes critical thinking was there all the time.
And yet upon reflection, there is the sense that 
reflective thinking and critical thinking are two different, 
yet closely related, types of thinking. By defining 
critical thinking as reflective thinking as Ennis does, 
we lose the force of ’critical1 and end up defining an 
undefined term by referring to yet another undefined term 
- "reflective thinking."
McPeck’s definition is in a stronger position than 
Ennis1s because he allies critical thinking with reflective 
skepticism. This alliance provides for the reflective 
aspect of critical thinking each theorist believes is 
necessary and provides for the critical aspect by fusing 
reflection with skepticism. This fusion takes McPeck1s 
definition beyond Ennisfs because (1) the critical, 
questioning aspect of critical thinking is provided for, 
and (2) critical thinking becomes other than just another 
name for reflective thinking.
Weddle in "McPeck^ Critical Thinking and Education", 
however, is not convinced that thinking critically about 
something is the same as thinking about it with reflective 
skepticism. Since thinking and critical thinking are about 
the skepticism would be aimed at some X. What, he asks, 
would that X be, the activity itself or the manner of
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engagement? Using poker as an example, Weddle claims that
it takes brains and guile to win at poker just as it does
with chess. However, you are not reflectively skeptical
about poker, you are playing it; therefore, X must refer
6 0to the manner of engagement. A careful reading of the
text would have shown Weddle the question was a moot one
since McPeck makes it quite clear in Chapter One of Critical
Thinking and Education that critical thinking concerns
the process of thinking not the outcome of it. Be that
as it may, Weddle sees poker's manner of engagement as
being critical, but not reflectively skeptical. As he
sees it, rational players who are reflectively skeptical
about the minutiae of the game do not engage in an activity
61- they cash in their chips.
I do not understand why Weddle believes we can engage 
critically in playing poker, but that we can not do so 
with reflective skepticism. He never clarifies his 
criticism. Clearly he believes playing poker involves 
thinking, since it takes "brains and guile" to win, so 
why would it not be possible to play poker with reflective 
skepticism? Part of the problem is his belief that 
reflective skepticism bogs you down in minutiae. He seems 
to believe that a player will be so busy thinking and 
questioning and creating alternate possibilities that he 
will become fossilized. This belief is false and depends 
either on a misreading of McPeck or on a lack of careful
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reading. McPeck clearly states that his definition does
6 2not allow for pervasive or unjustified questioning.
'Pervasive1 is the operative word here. Dredging up
minutiae would not be utilizing reflective skepticism.
Apart from McPeck's not providing a way to determine
when to question the norms of a subject and the vagueness
of the terms in his definition, the criticisms leveled
against it are not telling ones. However, McPeck gives
a second more formal definition. It sets out a problem
(X), the evidence for the problem area (E), and the
proposition or action in X (P).
Then we can say of a given student (S) that 
he is a critical thinker in area X if S 
has the disposition and skill to do X in 
such a way that E, or some subset of E, 
is suspended as being sufficient to establish 
the truth or viability of P.
Note that this definition shares a reliance on disposition
or propensity and skill with the first definition. You
do not have one without the other.
Oddly enough, after all the commentary directed at
McPeck's "reflective skepticism" definition, only Siegel
addresses this more formal definition. (At least in all
the material I have unearthed.) In "McPeck, Informal Logic
and the Nature of Critical Thinking," for instance, Siegel
asserts that McPeck, in his formal definition, is correct
6 4about "the act of suspension." However, while conferring 
praise on McPeck for this, Siegel continues by claiming 
that McPeck loses sight of this important point by grinding
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Furthermore, Siegel praises McPeck because he notices
the two necessary components of critical thinking - the
reason assessment component and the critical attitude
(willingness/desire to base actions on reasons). Both
components are necessary, but jointly they are sufficient
6 6for critical thinking. "To have the disposition and 
skill . . ." is to ask whether E provides compelling reasons 
for P.
This is, I think, the defining characteristic 
of critical thinking: the focus on reasons 
and the power of reasons to warrant or 
justify beliefs, claims, and actions. A 
critical thinker, then is one who is 
appropriately moved by reasons: she has 
the propensity or disposition to believe 
and act in accordance with reasons, and 
she has the ability to assess the force 
of reasons in the man^ contexts in which 
reasons play a role.
Siegel calls this the 'reasons1 conception.
Apart from these comments by Siegel on McPeck's second,
formal definition, which do not damn the definition itself,
it has gone largely unremarked. Perhaps theorists have
become so enamoured with his first definition that they
do not even notice the second; perhaps they feel that the
two are related and by undermining the first, they
automatically undermine the second. My point is that this
definition is neglected in the literature. Since the
criticisms leveled at the first definition bombard the
phrase "reflective skepticism", they have no effect on
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the second definition which does not mention it. If taking 
aim at subject-specificity is supposed to deal a knock-out 
blow to the second definition, the critics would have to 
specifically point out how this works - and they do not.
If they agree with it, it would be nice to know.
The definitions we have just been exploring work within 
the mandate of the argument outlined in Sections I and 
II. They also work within the limits outlined in McPeck's 
ten features. This being the case, we will examine the 
features next.
(IV) The Features of Critical Thinking 
With the definitions brought into the open, we will 
now look at the ten features of critical thinking scattered 
throughout Critical Thinking and Education. These features 
set the limits for the above definitions. They indicate 
how the definitions must operate for thinking to be critical 
and indicate how they do not operate. However, it is 
imperative that we realize that these features are very 
broad. They do not, for example, give us a way to tell 
which critical skills to bring to bear on a problem. Some 
he states openly, others need to be extracted.
Nevertheless, these features indicate, in general terms, 
what critical thinking does and does not include, its place 
among other intellectual activities, and how it manifests 
itself.
(1) Critical Thinking and Non-propositional Logic
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In his critique of Robert Ennis's first attempt at
defining critical thinking, i.e. "the correct assessing
6 8of statements,11 McPeck argues that that definition is
too narrow.
any activity requiring deliberation is 
capable of employing critical thinking, 
and that it is not restricted to 
propositional knowledge.
In addition, there are many activities (for 
example, mountain climbing) and skills 
(chess, competitive wrestling and so one) 
that permit critical thought but do not 
necessarily ^gvolve the 'assessment of 
statements.'
Thus critical thinking can be manifested in as many
ways as there are types of activities that can be thought
critically about - and these are innumerable. These
activities can include acts of physical strength, dexterity,
and the assessment of statements of some kind. Given the
large number of activities, it is likely that there is
a correspondingly large number of criteria for its correct
application. "In this sense the phrase 'critical thinking'
functions like the term 'creative': actions that deserve
the epithet vary widely, but the intended meaning is
71constantly identifiable." Critical thinking not only 
affects activities involving deliberation, but its nature 
and criteria alter with the nature of the activity.
From the above it is clear that non-propositional 
knowledge must play a large role in critical thinking. 
However, McPeck does not develop this side of critical 
thinking anymore than Ennis does. In fact McPeck limits
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the discussion to the assessment of statements and
propositional knowledge since that "is the prime area of
72interest in academic subjects." I have seen no examples
in any of the literature of the development of his theory
when applied to "decisions, skills, methods, and 
73techniques." Since his concept of critical thinking 
involves more than the artificial boundaries set up in 
Chapter Two and in his book, I can only wonder how McPeck 
sees it working for non-propositional knowledge.
(2) Critical Thinking is Voluntary and Directed
74Critical thinking is voluntary and directed. In 
order to think critically we must be consciously addressing 
some issue or problem, and we must decide to do so.
Sometimes thoughts will seem to come upon us unexpectedly 
or uninvitedly; for instance, when we gaze at cloud 
formations and suddenly 'see' a horse's head in a cloud. 
Looking at the cloud is voluntary; however, the image of 
the horse's head popped in without being consciously 
thought. Imagination, which McPeck states is another 
description of how we think,^ often works that way. To 
be an instance of critical thinking, we must not only want 
to and decide to think critically about something, we must 
also direct our thought processes. Knowing the problem 
and knowing what is being sought and why, the critical 
thinker follows the paths- he needs to satisfy his purpose 
in thinking critically about it.
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(3) Critical Thinking is a Task and Achievement Concept
Critical thinking is a task and an achievement 
7 6concept. When we talk about a task concept as opposed 
to an achievement concept, our concern is with the means 
of acquiring something rather than with the desired end.
An achievement concept focuses on the end achieved rather 
than the process used to reach it. Machiavelli's political 
theory, for example, can best be described as an achievement 
concept. Gaining and holding power, the end, justifies 
any actions, however unethical and brutal, to acquire it. 
According to McPeck, critical thinking is concerned'with 
both how we achieve an end and the achievement itself.
A task concept focuses on the process used to achieve an 
end. The concern is with how the end is reached, not with 
whether or not the 'correct1 answer is achieved nor with 
always reaching a resolution. Thus, there can be errors 
in critical thinking. Skills can be used with varying 
degrees of efficacy. The definitions indicated that 
critical thinking depends on using critical skills, so 
it makes sense that critical thinking is a task concept.
However, McPeck1s brief explanation suggests that 
critical thinking is a task but not an achievement concept. 
When solving a problem we cannot tell from the solution 
if it was reached critically, only the process used to 
reach it can be described this way. Furthermore, McPeck
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
tells us, even if the process (the task) is performed
critically there is no guarantee we will reach a solution
77or that the solution will work. In other words, there 
is no guarantee of attaining an achievement. Despite his 
claiming critical thinking is both a task and achievement 
concept, his argument supports critical thinking as a task 
and not an achievement concept unless he conceives of 
'achievement' in another way.
Note: features (4) and (5) lend support to this 
conclusion, as we shall see, since they depend upon there 
not being a 'right' or 'correct' answer and upon some people 
being more critical than others. Focusing on 'achievement' 
can mean assuming some of the difficulties attendant with 
'correctness', because achievement focuses on the end 
achieved. 'Achievement' can be read as wanting the 
'correct' solution. To defuse this situation McPeck needs 
to clarify what he means by 'achievement' and how it 
relates to 'task', and to couch his supporting argument 
in such terms that defend critical thinking as both, not 
just as a task concept.
(4) Critical Thinking Involves Degrees of Skill
The skills necessary for critical thinking admit of 
7 ft
degrees. Some people will have a greater grasp of the 
skills involved than others will, because skills are born 
of knowledge and experience in specific areas, and everyone 
has a unique history. Since critical thinking is concerned
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with the means, not the end to a problem, success cannot
7 9always be guaranteed or expected. This feature is closely 
related to feature three, but it is concerned more with 
the background a critical thinker brings to bear on the 
process than on the process itself.
(5) Critical Thinking and 'Correctness'
The fifth boundary can be extracted from (1), (3),
and (4), and that is that the notion of 'correctness' is
inappropriate to the concept of critical thinking. There
are two ways of understanding 'correct' when it is applied
to critical thinking. It can stand for right (versus
wrong), or it can stand for some appropriate procedure
being followed.
When 'correct' functions as 'being right', it advances
"a formal or absolute notion of critical thinking that
8 0permits of neither degrees nor mistakes." Thus, it rules 
out both the third and fourth features. The third is ruled 
out because by focusing on whether an answer is 'right 
or wrong', we ignore the possibility that a solution may 
not have been reached critically, and by thus focusing 
on 'achievement', the 'task' facet is ignored. An absolute 
notion of being correct does not permit degrees or mistakes; 
thus, the fourth feature is ruled out. Since the argument 
McPeck offers for the third tells us that critical thinking 
focuses on process rather'than on outcome, there can be 
degrees of skill and mistakes made in reaching a goal.
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McPeck believes that Ennis missed the fact that thinking 
critically is a function of how a particular result is 
pursued not with what the result is. "Just as rationality 
is a function not of what is believed but of the way in 
which a belief is arrived at, so too with critical with 
critical thinking."81
McPeck should agree that a person can correctly follow 
a process even if the goal sought is never reached. For 
instance, if the goal is to solve a problem critically, 
then, broadly speaking, according to his definition, the 
correct procedure would be to bring reflective skepticism 
to bear. How well you use this procedure to a great extent 
depends upon how much practice you have had. The fact 
remains that 'correctness1, as McPeck initially conceived 
it, has no place in critical thinking, and he was right 
to overtly exclude it.
(6) Critical Thinking and Rationality
Critical thinking is not equivalent to rationality
8 2or reasoning in general; it is a subset of it. McPeck 
does not develop what rationality is, since he considers 
the concept to be too complex to be dealt with.88 For 
this discussion he provisionally describes rationality 
as an "intelligent use of all available evidence for the 
solution of some problem."8^
Critical thinking makes itself useful and gains 
conceptual content when we hit a problematic juncture in
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"The concept of critical thinking merely marks out the 
facet of rationality that comprises the disposition, and 
skill to find such difficulties in the normal course of
O C
reasoning." McPeck admits that this is not a full 
analysis, but believes it goes some way in clarifying a 
lot of the confusion and disagreement surrounding critical 
thinking and its relation to education.
I am afraid that I cannot agree with this last 
statement, which seems to me to be overly optimistic. 
McPeck recognizes that a problem exists in discussions 
°f critical thinking and informal logic due to the use 
of opaque, yet related terms like 'rationality1, 
'reasoning', 'problem solving', 'intelligence', 'decision
making'f 'thinking', etc. - i.e. what has been referred
. 86
to as the Network Problem. I would like to commend him 
for realizing there are differences and for attempting 
to deal with the difference between critical thinking and 
nationality even in some small fashion. However, even 
granting that he is not giving a detailed analysis, I 
believe we need either to hear more on the relation between 
rationality and critical thinking or to hear something 
a little different, to see that this analysis is even 
warranted. At this juncture in his analysis, this 
discussion's inclusion is unnecessary and clouds the issue. 
For instance, we should know why critical thinking
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is needed at McPeck's problematic junctures and what it
brings to bear upon such a juncture that rationality itself
cannot. As matters stand, critical thinking and rationality
seem to be the same thing since critical thinking, like
rationality, is concerned with using evidence to solve 
8 7problems. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that
rationality involves "the intelligent use of all available
8 8evidence" (italics mine). What constitutes "intelligent 
use" and would we not prefer critical thinking to be done 
intelligently? The difference between the two remains 
unclear.
(7) Critical Thinking and Creative Thinking 
Despite arguments early in Chapter One, McPeck 
implicitly links creative and critical thinking. In those 
early arguments (pp. 4 - 5), where McPeck tries to 
illustrate why critical thinking is mistakenly reified 
into a curriculum subject, he suggests that this reification 
occurs because of the emphasis on 'critical' as if critical 
thinking alters the nature and operation of thinking. 
However, 'critical' behaves like 'precocious,1 
'imaginative', 'sensitive', and 'creative1, which qualify 
thinking and which, in themselves, do not describe what
Q  Q
is being thought about. "Adding the adjective 'critical' 
to the phrase 'thinking about X' describes in some general 
way how something is thought about, but it does not describe 
that something.
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Notice that 'critical' and 'creative' are two different
types of thinking. He describes 'creative' as being
something usually novel and aesthetically appealing while
'critical' could be, but does not always, function in
91conjunction with it.
However, no matter what his early explanations lead
us to believe about the relationship between 'creative'
and 'critical' thinking, he clearly believes the two are
in some way connected. When he argues that logic is of
limited value to critical thinking he concludes that
Logic can help to eliminate hypotheses, 
conjectures, and plausible solutions, but 
it cannot provide them. In the most common 
problem solving situations within disciplines 
and working fields of knowledge, the most 
difficult - and perhaps most important - 
phase is that of producing a hypothesis, 
conjecture, or alternative that is worth 
checking or trying out.
He clearly implies that generating hypotheses and 
alternatives are important for critical thinking; however, 
providing such hypotheses, especially when alternative 
standards are sought, is a function of creativity. Thus 
McPeck implicitly links creative with critical thinking.
McPeck would have been better off by explicitly drawing 
out this link. Without it critical thinking is hopelessly 
stunted, lacking its hypothesis-building component. As 
Micheal Scriven notes, and as McPeck himself would agree, 
'critical' alone is negative. It must be constructive 
and creative to lead to new knowledge. Thinking of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
alternative hypotheses is a creative act; moreover,
creativity is useless without critical skills since,
presumably, it takes critical thinking to know where
9 3creativity ought to be applied. Ennis states that "This 
conception (of rational thinking) combines creative 
thinking, critical thinking, and problem solving - all
9 4skills that are thoroughly interdependent in practice."
(8) Critical Thinking and Problem Solving 
From the quote on the limitations of logic on critical 
thinking, McPeck concludes that the prescriptions logic 
can make are so general and so obvious as to be virtually 
useless in problem solving.^ I am concerned with McPeck's 
alliance of critical thinking and problem solving. The 
above sentence typifies the identification which McPeck 
makes throughout Critical Thinking and Education and 
throughout his articles on the subject.
The link is also in evidence in several places (pages 
9/ 15, 16, and 17) in just the first chapter of his book 
and this list is by no means exhaustive. A good example 
appears in "Trivial Pursuit." "Critical thinking ability 
• • . varies directly with the amount of knowledge required 
by the problem."^6 He uses J.P. Guilford in "The Evaluation 
of Critical Thinking Programs: Dangers and Dogmas" to 
support his contention about the non-generalizability of 
skills, and it also supports his alignment of critical 
thinking with problem solving. "'Problems are simply too
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varied, and each type seems to call upon its own pattern
of abilities.'"^7
This identification of critical thinking with problem
solving is yet another aspect of the Network Problem.
Problem solving often involves critical thinking. However,
I am not prepared to agree that all problem solving needs
to utilize critical thinking to derive a solution. Deciding
which is the most efficacious route to reach a mountain
summit is a problem, but as I will argue in the last
chapter, it is not a case for critical thinking.
Alternately, not all critical thinking revolves around
a problem to be solved. As Jonathan Adler points out,
we can engage in critical thinking simply out of
9 8intellectual curiousity. It is not the case that 
something needs to be amiss.
Critical thinking might be equated with problem solving 
if it were stipulated that a 'problem' consists of any 
situation where we must choose one facet from many available 
ones. However, I believe that would mean expanding the 
nature of what constitutes a problem far beyond what is 
normally meant by the word. It would be stipulating the 
meaning of 'problem' just to fit McPeck's concept of 
critical thinking.
(9)Critical Thinking and the Exclusion of Value Judgments 
In Chapter Three McPeck uses Ennis, once again, as 
a jumping off point to establish another feature of critical
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thinking. He sees the most serious limitation of Ennis's 
list of critical thinking skills and attitudes as its 
exclusion of value judgments. For McPeck, and this is 
a crucial thing to realize, critical thinking is full of 
value judgments.
As he points out, any decision about how much evidence
is enough is a direct function of how important it is that
a statement be right or wrong. A determination of what
is more important depends upon assessing each piece of
evidence in terms of the relative value placed on them.
"A person's values are an integral feature of rational
judgment, and the pragmatic dimension (in Ennis's theory)
9 9properly serves to underline this fact."
The inclusion of 'value judgments' in this list of 
features of critical thinking is something of a chimera.
What people typically mean, and what Ennis means, by 'value 
judgment' is prescribing a judgment, such as good, evil, 
right, wrong, beautiful, or ugly to certain things, actions, 
and entities. The statement "abortion is wrong" is a value 
judgment. It is also a good example of why Ennis does 
not wish to include value judgments in the early stages 
of learning how to think critically. Many issues revolving 
around 'value judgments' are contentious and more likely 
to cloud the discussion and retard the assimilation of 
critical thinking skills and dispositions than clarify 
them. Students can become so engrossed in arguing their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
own points of view that they miss the material that they 
are supposed to be learning.
When 'value judgments' are understood this way I am
certain that McPeck would agree that they ought not to
be included when the criteria of critical thinking are
first being broached -even if they are being broached in
specific subjects. To include them would only confuse
those students who are attempting to gain a minimal
understanding of the subject and who are not yet able to
operate as successful critical thinkers. When McPeck
discusses critical thinking tests in Chapter Six of his
book, he makes it clear that he is aware of the problems
attendant with the inclusion of 'value judgments'. He
points out that many questions in such tests are meant
to be done without allowing personal attitudes and values
to interfere. However, the questions depend on a
person's political views. "What one considers important,
which is one of the requirements of 'strong' argument is
1 01similarly determined by one's value orientation." McPeck
thinks, and I agree, that the correct response would be 
to attack the inadequacy of the questions, but that option 
is not available. The point is, McPeck recognizes the 
trouble that value judgments can cause and, in critical 
thinking tests, for example, he would prefer to point out 
that that is a problem rather than still use the faulty 
questions.
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Taking McPeck's awareness of the problems with 
including 'value judgments' in critical thinking, we have 
to wonder why he berates Ennis for excluding them and for 
insisting that value judgments belong in critical thinking. 
The reason is that when McPeck aligns himself against Ennis 
he is unaware that he and Ennis are talking about two 
different and compatible things. Ennis, as we have seen, 
is talking about the difficulty of assessing value 
judgments. In his reply to Ennis, McPeck insists that 
assessing reasoning is an activity which belongs to the 
class, evaluating. By asserting that critical thinking 
involves 'evaluating' McPeck believes that he is denying 
Ennis's proposition that 'value judgments' need to withheld 
from critical thinking at this point.
McPeck is mistaken. Clearly, Ennis is not denying 
that critical thinking involves evaluating. I am sure 
that he would agree that determining whether one piece 
of evidence for a belief is more important than another 
piece of evidence depends on assessing each piece of 
evidence in terms of the relative value placed on them. 
'Value judgments', however, are a class of things that 
must be evaluated; therefore, Ennis's proposition and 
McPeck's proposition are not incompatible. Ennis merely 
wishes to remove 'value judgments' from McPeck's evaluation 
process at this time.
I stated earlier in the discussion of 'value judgments
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that including 'value judgments' in McPeck's list of 
features is a chimera. I said this because McPeck's 
inclusion of 'value judgments' was not quite what it 
appeared to be on the surface. To say that critical 
thinking needs to include evaluating, which is what McPeck 
wants, is not as profound and as arguable as saying that 
'value judgments', in Ennis's sense, ought to be included 
in critical thinking since I can think of no one who would 
deny critical thinking involves evaluating and many who 
would agree withholding 'value judgments' would do no harm.
(10) Critical Thinking and Logic
The final feature of critical thinking is one of
omission rather than addition. Throughout Critical Thinking
and Education and the various journal articles, McPeck
has made it quite clear that critical thinking cannot be
equated to logic - either formal or informal. Chapter
Four of his book deals specifically with the inadequacy
of informal logic to meet the needs of critical thinking.
Among other things he argues that people can be
102critical thinkers and not informal logicians, there
1 03is no difference between informal logic and rhetoric,
informal logic devalues the complex and ambiguous nature
of knowledge,1*^4 and that informal logic is concerned with
1 05validity rather than truth and answers to problems.
I will not address the soundness of the above arguments 
because they could encompass a chapter all by themselves.
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Suffice it to say there are strong arguments advanced 
against each of his main premises and his overall conclusion 
that informal logic and critical thinking do not belong 
together. I will say that in my opinion his analysis of 
informal logic fails primarily because he misinterprets 
the nature and conditions of informal logic. However,
I admit that this claim requires defense. What we must 
understand, at this point, is that McPeck sees critical 
thinking and logic - formal and informal - as two very 
different things.
(V) Summary
The title of this chapter, The Meaning of Critical 
Thinking, is taken from the first chapter of Critical 
Thinking and Education. McPeck wants to provide the first 
thorough analysis of the concept of critical thinking and 
he devotes the first two chapters to this analysis.
The important point for us to see in his analysis 
is the conceptual link he makes between critical thinking 
and epistemology. All of McPeck's arguments on critical 
thinking, whether they be about the failure of informal 
logic theory or of critical thinking, revolve around this 
point. it is imperative that we understand that McPeck 
reached this position due to some very basic assumptions; 
namely, (1) thinking is always about some X, (2) there 
is no set of generalized skills called critical thinking, 
an<i (3) critical thinking, therefore, is subject-specific.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ANALYSIS OF MCPECK'S CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING
. . . because collective human experience has 
discovered that different kinds of beliefs often 
have different kinds of good reason supporting 
them, it follows that there will be many different 
epistemologies corresponding to different fields 
of human endeavour. A corollary of this is that 
logic itself is parasitic upon epistemology, 
since logic is merely the formalization of good 
reasons once they have been discovered. Thus 
epistemology, and to some extent logic, have 
intra-field validity but not necessarily 
inter-field validity.
The above quote appears in Chapter Seven of Critical 
Thinking and Education and embodies much of what is wrong 
with McPeck1s conception of critical thinking. Here, for 
instance, we see him explicitly apportioning epistemology 
into separate epistemologies which, as we shall see, Siegel 
cites as a major difficulty with McPeck1s position.
However, Siegel did not follow his criticism to its logical 
conclusion. I will do just that, arguing that the same 
reasoning has the upshot that there are as many different 
concepts of critical thinking as there are fields of human 
endeavour.
As we shall see, the arguments McPeck used to support 
his three premises and his conclusion about the nature 
and operation of critical thinking lead to the above
67
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of the concepts he uses allows undermining of his theory 
of critical thinking to be undermined.
From the above sorts of considerations, I will conclude 
that McPeck's concept of critical thinking fails because 
(1) the vagueness of the related concepts that he uses 
to define critical thinking lead to an ill-defined concept 
of critical thinking, and (2) the arguments establishing 
the concept of critical thinking, as well as establishing 
the network terms, lead to the conclusion that there is 
no concept of critical thinking. His analysis argues the 
object of that analysis into non-existence. The arguments 
mentioned in (2) make (1) possible because it is (2)'s 
arguments that link the network terms together making 
critical thinking vulnerable.
We will examine many of these related terms in the 
following Sections. In our exploration we will see how 
closely these terms become connected, why they turn out 
to be subject-specific (even where McPeck would not find 
it desirable), and finally how the combination of being 
ill-defined and subject-specific topples McPeck's conception 
of critical thinking. We will start with 'subject', since, 
if virtually everything turns out to be subject-specific, 
it is necessary to know what a subject is. We will move 
on to 'reasons' which support our knowing 'subjects', to 
the overt relationships between critical thinking, 
epistemology, and rationality, and to the relationships 
between critical thinking, argument analysis, and informal
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ogic. Finally, we will see how the relationships outlined 
in the preceding Sections lead to the failure of McPeck's 
concept of critical thinking.
(I) Subjects, Fields, Domains, and Disciplines
Before I demonstrate the vagueness of terms like
'rationality', 'critical thinking', 'epistemology', and
'argument'; before presenting Siegel's argument against
McPeck's theory of epistemology; and before explaining
specifically how his concept of critical thinking shatters,I
will examine the nature of a term- which plays a central
role in McPeck's theory: 'subject'. This discussion belongs
here rather than in Chapter Two because first in Chapter
Two my main concern was with illustrating the arguments
that led to the conclusion that critical thinking is
subject-specific, and any exploration of the nature of
'subject' would have confused matters, and second the nature
of 'subject', like the nature of 'rationality' and 'critical
thinking' is vague.
My first concern revolves around an issue of
clarification. In the critical thinking literature we
often see subject-specificity used interchangeably with
field, domain, and discipline-specificity;  ^ however, all
four terms remain vague. McPeck, unfortunately, does not
see that he .has a problem. He says that
One of the strengths of the present analysis 
is that while it recognizes that critical thinking 
is connected logically with specific tasks or 
subject matter, it places no a priori restriction
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On the face of it, McPeck has a good case. 'Subject' is 
vague, because it is meant to be in order to prevent 
critical thinking from being too narrowly limited. However 
we now have no idea what critical skills to bring to bear 
on a problem since critical skills depend on the subject, 
and as I shall shortly argue, we have no way of telling 
what constitutes a subject. In Chapter Two, I argued that 
McPeck gave us no mechanism for deciding what critical 
skills are necessary when we at least had a subject. Here 
we do not even have that, since subjects could be either 
very broad or very narrow. What do critical thinking skill 
become then? How narrowly or broadly should we take them?
I would like some specific examples to show precisely 
what McPeck means by different kinds of knowledge or what 
he means by 'subject'. In "Critical Thinking and 
Subject-Specificity Clarification and Needed Research"
Ennis differentiates between 'subject1, 'discipline', and 
'domain'. Sometimes, he points out, 'subject' means 
something taught in school and sometimes simply a topic
g
under consideration. Since McPeck clearly wants critical 
thinking to apply to circumstances and situations outside 
school, i think we can take it that he holds Ennis's latter 
characterization. However, we do not advance any further 
with this realization since we do not know what 'topic' 
encompasses or how critical thinking skills relate to it. 
Eurthermore, even if McPeck would agree with Ennis's
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suitably vague characterization of 'subject', he does not
agree when Ennis characterizes McPeck approach as having
a discipline bias. In Chapter Seven he explicitly denies
7
that is the case. For him, subject matter is broader 
than the kinds of disciplines we meet in University.
However, even after Ennis's intervention is considered 
there is no help for McPeck. Clarifying McPeck's position 
on whether 'subject' refers to only in-school topics does 
not clarify what McPeck means by 'subject'. I can see 
two possibilities: (1) compartmentalizing life into areas 
as subjects as in school, i.e. equating it to 'discipline', 
as he seems to have been doing in his discussion up until 
now, despite his denial, or (2) focusing on broader domains 
even broader than religious knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, since he means critical thinking to apply to 
a pursuit like mountain climbing. However, to simplify 
the matter I will limit this discussion to easily 
distinguishable domains like religious belief and scientifi 
knowledge. The breadth of the domains is enough to 
illustrate what is wrong with this broad characterization. 
Under (1) for example, we would find an issue like 
alcoholism divided into its legal, biological, 
psychological, cultural, etc. aspects. Science would be 
divided into biology, physics, chemistry, etc. as subjects 
with each maintaining its own language, own epistemology, 
and own type of good reasons. We often see McPeck using 
axamples that suggest such a reading.
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In (2), I can see how an acceptable type of reason 
for belief in a religious context, like faith in the Bible, 
knowledge from religious tenets, or talking to God, would 
be unacceptable in a scientific context. In the Christian 
tradition commentators, for example, start with the premise 
"There is a God" and shape their critical discussions and 
base inferences on this premise. Alternatively, many 
philosophers start with the question "Is there a God?" 
rather than with the positive assertion that He exists 
and their inference base takes an entirely different course.
If McPeck prefers (2), focusing on broader domains, 
then he needs to explain what 'subjects' or 'domains' he 
has in mind. The domains are not self-explanatory, and 
he does not provide any criteria for deciding what the 
limits of a subject are to be nor how to discover them.
And in fact it is unlikely that he means (2) because, 
notwithstanding the fact there are no Renaissance men,
McPeck clearly thinks there can be experts in subjects 
areas, or at least, individuals who are sufficiently 
immersed in the subjects to engage in critical evaluations 
which are impossible without understanding that subject.
'Subjects' as set up in (2) are too broad to breed 
either experts, unless those purported experts are truly 
exceptional people, or people well versed in the subject. 
Whoever heard of a scientific expert who could speak with 
equal authority in any given scientific area? Medicine 
as science is a case in point. Someone with a Ph.D. in
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Physics may be an expert in physics, but not in medicine. 
Even a medical doctor cannot speak authoritatively in every 
area of medicine. When determining why someone died, a 
pathologist makes a better witness in court than a general 
practitioner, cardiologist, or neurologist would on the 
same topic. All the above may be scientific experts and 
fit into (2)'s science domain, but the domain itself is 
too broad for anyone to be well versed in the subject - 
science. It would seem that 'subject' must refer to 
something narrower by far than the type of broad domains 
I have suggested. The problem intensifies if we replace 
the domains I used with the even broader domains McPeck's 
analysis indicates.
(II) Reasons and Fallacies 
Assuming that the nature of 'subject' has been 
established, and whether we take it, by a process of 
elimination, to be a discipline' or to be something else 
which we have not in actuality discussed, we discover yet 
another characterization - this time we need to know what 
McPeck means by different types of reasons. Knowing and 
understanding a subject means we must be able to provide 
reasons as to why a certain 'fact' is so; yet, he does 
not specify what constitutes a 'reason'. He needs to 
furnish examples of what he considers to be different types 
of reasons. If much of collective human experience is 
subject-specific, including what constitutes good reasons,
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as the first quote in this chapter suggests, would it be 
outrageous to conclude that types of reasons are also 
subject-specific? I do not think so.
McPeck has argued that what constitutes an instance
Q
of critical thinking depends on the subject matter. That 
is to say, what qualifies a particular instance of thinking 
or a particular skill as critical depends upon the subject 
and circumstances surrounding that instance of thinking
or that skill. A critical thinker in art history has the
requisite skills and experience to know how to apply those
skills critically and, since he is immersed in the field,
when to bring them to bear. That art historian, if we 
assume all he knows is art history, would not qualify as 
a critical thinker in the philosophy of religion, because 
he would not be immersed in the requisite field; hence, 
he would be unable to discern when critical thinking is 
needed and what skills to bring to bear.
What constitutes a good reason for a belief, or rather 
what constitutes knowing what a good reason is, depends 
on the discipline to which the reason belongs. Our art 
historian knows what the best reasons are for placing 
Michelangelo amongst the world's great sculptors. He knows, 
for instance, why David is a masterpiece, and its place 
in Renaissance art. Our art historian would not know what 
constitutes a good reason in discussions about the 
Immaculate Conception, because he would not be steeped 
in the epistemology of religious theory. Conversely,
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someone immersed in religious theory would not thereby 
understand what makes Michelangelo, as an artist, great.
It follows that types of reasons are subject-specific.
Those who know the subject have mastered the epistemology 
of the discipline and know when a reason is a good one.
Granting that what constitutes a good reason depends 
on the subject, the question remains; Are there different 
types of reasons and do they have intra-field or inter-field 
validity? Given McPeck's arguments on critical thinking, 
it follows that he would have to argue that different 
subjects accept different types of reasons. The type of 
factors acceptable as reasons in religion are not, or might 
not be, acceptable in art, law, psychology, etc., and vice 
versa. Just as skills and methods belong to separate 
subjects, so too do reasons.
This position may become clearer if we examine McPeck's 
treatment of informal logic. Following his account of 
Johnson and Blair's description of informal logic in Chapter 
Four, McPeck bisects the subject into fallacy theory and
g
argumentation theory. For the most part his treatment 
focuses on fallacy theory. This treatment will aid us 
in understanding the subject-specific nature of reasons, 
because in my estimation fallacies exhibit the same logical 
behaviour as reasons do.
Informal Logic Fallacies 
Informal logic propounds the idea that there are
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identifiable and common errors that occur in the normal
course of reasoning. These errors (when identified,
labeled, and their conditions formulated) are called
fallacies. A fallacy applies across subjects. Once you
know what equivocation is, for example, then, to put it
in its simplest form, you are supposed to realize that
equivocation is the same whatever the discipline. Informal
logic is meant to be a subject unto itself and applicable
to other subjects; whereas, critical thinking is in McPeck's
view subsumed by the epistemology of subjects. That basic
difference explains why informal logic allows for
inter-field validity, and McPeck's critical thinking does
not. Ennis argues that fallacies have bridge-jumping 
i o
criteria. That is, their criteria are such that fallacies 
apply to many subjects.
McPeck, however, argues that the only thing that 
instances of assumption identification, equivocation, ad 
hominem, irrelevant reasons, etc. share from subject to 
subject is the name. What counts as an assumption depends 
upon the subject in question. General prescriptions are 
unhelpful if you lack a thorough working knowledge of the 
field so that you can identify one.
Since McPeck's argument and main premises support 
dividing life into different epistemologies, and since 
his characterization of "different kinds of belief", rests 
on having "different kinds of good reason supporting 
them,"1”1 i must conclude that reasons operate in a similar
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subject-specific fashion. 'Reason1 functions like
'equivocation1. The name 'reason' applies across various
subjects, but what counts as a reason depends upon the
subject in question.
McPeck, and Johnson and Blair, are seeking two
different things. Johnson and Blair state that
By the theory of fallacy, we mean the attempt 
to formulate with clarity and rigour the 
conditions under which a particular fallacy 
occurs, along with related question about the 
nature and/or existence of various kinds of 
fallacy.
Johnson and Blair suggest that there is a lack of progress 
on fallacies, such as irrelevant reason, and claim a great 
deal of work remains to be done. McPeck suggests that 
they are wrong. The kind of account Johnson and Blair 
require cannot, in principle, be given because "canons 
of relevance and standards of adequacy are dependent on 
subject matter."^
I believe that McPeck wants all the specific conditions 
set out. By saying that fallacies depend on the subject 
in question McPeck would never accept a general account.
He wants to know what makes a case of equivocation, for 
example, a instance of equivocation for each subject. 
Naturally, it would be impossible to provide for every 
eventuality and every subject in a definition. However, 
even he should agree that the nature of equivocation does 
not alter, but what makes for an instance of equivocation 
does change from subject to subject. Johnson and Blair
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are seeking the general nature, not the specific one.
McPeck's criticsms are not telling since he is after
something different from Johnson and Blair. Simply to
say that they ought to provide what he himself would want
is not enough.
When discussing the theory of argumentation, McPeck
argues informal logicians assume that 1generalizable1,
(which fallacies are purported to be) is equivalent to
'repeatable1.**^  He characterizes 'generalizable* as "a
principle applied in one area of. human experience that
1 5must also apply in others." This, he says, overlooks 
the distinction between repeatable in a domain and applying 
to several domains. Fallacies, critical skills, and reasons 
can be used again and again (i.e. repeatable) in a domain 
or subject and are, in that sense, generalizable; however, 
they are not generalizable in the sense that they are 
repeatable across several domains. McPeck employs the
1 6analogy that the rules of one game do not apply in others.
The comparison should not be made at the level of 
rules of games. What is most important for our purposes 
here is what makes a rule a rule rather than what makes 
it a rule of this game rather than a rule of another game. 
Perhaps the point would be easier to understand if I put 
it on the level of games. What is important is what makes 
a game a game rather than what makes it one particular 
game rather than another. We want to know what it is about 
Monopoly, Super Mario Brothers, poker, and baseball that
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makes them all games. Or, to put it back on the level 
of rules, what it is about the rules of the games that 
makes them all rules.
Fallacies and reasons, in my view, are like games. 
Fallacies have criteria, just as games have rules. Each 
fallacy has its own set of criteria, just as each game 
has its own set of rules. However, I am not comparing 
a fallacy like equivocation to a game like Monopoly. I 
am comparing a fallacy like equivocation to the concept 
of game(s) itself. Equivocation is general, its criteria 
are general, and it applies in many subjects. The nature 
of a game is general, rules which are part of games are 
general, and the concept applies to many activities.
McPeck prefers, wrongly I believe, to compare fallacies 
(reasons) with individual rules of individual games. On 
those terms he is correct to assert that the rules of one 
game do not apply in others, but, as I have said, I believe 
this analogy to be misguided.
I have argued that on McPeck's account of things 
reasons must be aligned with different subjects, that there 
are types of reasons that belong to different areas of 
belief, that the concept of 'reasons' is subject-specific 
and hence, conceptually linked to epistemology just as 
critical thinking is. Whatever happens to epistemology 
befalls 'reasons' and 'critical thinking'.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
(III) The Analogous Situation Between Rationality, 
Epistemologyy and Critical Thinking
McPeck establishes relationships between critical 
thinking and a number of other concepts such as, 
rationality, epistemology, informal logic, and argument 
analysis. Here we are interested in rationality, critical 
thinking, and epistemology. We have already examined where 
he sees that link coming from and why. We are concerned, 
at this time, with how the equation of rationality and 
critical thinking connects the equation of epistemology 
and critical thinking. The relationships between the three 
concepts and how they support one another is important; 
the way McPeck moves from rationality to critical thinking 
to epistemology is not so important. If these concepts 
are closely intertwined and some, or all, are based on 
faulty assumptions, then just as types of reasons and
fallacies become suspect because of their ill-defined
*
natures, then so too will rationality, which is closely 
connected to the latter two concepts.
In Chapter Two McPeck characterizes epistemology as
the
Analyses of good reasons for various beliefs.
Ideally, epistemology attempts to provide the 
very best reasons for holding a belief, and to 
this extent its purpose is identical with that 
of rationality . . . QL€3 includes understanding 
concepts and peculiarities of the nature of 
evidence, as they are understood by practitioners 
in the^ield from which they emanate (italics 
mine).
Earlier we saw that McPeck chose not to develop what
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rationality is on the ground that the concept was too
complex; however, he did provisionally describe it as an
; "intelligent use of all available evidence for the solution
j *| g
of some problem." We must assume that providing the
j
j very best reasons for holding a belief is the same as
; intelligently using all available evidence to find a
i
! solution to a problem. Remember, McPeck aligns critical
thinking with problem solving and has also placed critical 
thinking in the justification process of coming to hold 
a belief.
; Since rationality and epistemology share the samei
purpose, are we to suppose that rationality is equivalent
i
1 to epistemology? Looking back to McPeck's characterization
of epistemology, we note that he does say that the two
*
concepts share the same purpose to the extent that 
 ^ epistemology attempts to provide the best reasons for
holding a belief (italics mine). The phrase "to the extent" 
suggests that there are differences. Unfortunately, if 
there are such differences we are not told what they are. 
Perhaps McPeck did not provide them because to do so would 
include developing the concept of rationality (which I 
argued in Chapter One he needs to do); or because he thought 
the differences were obvious; or because he did not think 
failing to do so would damage his work; or because some 
instinct told him to add a qualifying phrase. Whatever 
the reason, we are left with the concepts of rationality 
and epistemology sharing the same purpose and lacking any
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visible differences. We are left with the question, since 
there are no obvious differences are the two concepts then 
equivalent? If not equivalent, then since they share the 
same purpose, they seem to be related. In what fashion 
and how closely are they related? If only contingently 
rather than necessarily, then if the arguments for one 
are proven to be invalid the other concept will have a 
reasonable chance of survival; that is, unless it is based 
upon some very basic and misguided assumptions underlying 
the arguments and characterizations of most of his concepts 
- which may very likely prove to be the case here.
Remember also that in Chapter One of Critical Thinking
and Education McPeck claimed that critical thinking is
an aspect of rationality; since there are no visible
differences between McPeck's characterization rationality
and epistemology, then it can be said that it follows that
critical thinking is also an aspect of epistemology. This
conclusion follows not only because rationality and
epistemology appear to be equivalent (which would naturally
lead to the conclusion that critical thinking shares the
same relationship with both since both would be virtually
the same thing), but because critical thinking is also
connected to rationality by their having a similar purpose.
"The concept of critical thinking merely marks out the
facet of rationality that comprises the disposition, and
skill to find such difficulties in the normal course of 
1 9reasoning." The purpose of critical thinking is to
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satisfy the purpose of rationality. Rationality shares 
its purpose with epistemology; therefore, critical 
thinking's purpose is epistemology1s purpose. Since to 
satisfy this purpose critical thinking operates as an aspect 
of rationality, then to satisfy epistemology1s purpose 
critical thinking must be an aspect of epistemology as 
well.
It makes a certain amount of sense to suggest that 
if critical thinking is to be taught as integral to the 
subject and if a subject is to be taught from an 
epistemological standpoint, as McPeck wishes, then critical 
thinking is an aspect of epistemology. That is, it makes 
a certain amount of sense if we assume that there is more 
to epistemology than critical thinking.
On the other hand, in Chapter Two I argued that the 
division between critical thinking and rationality is not 
as clear-cut as McPeck has made it out to be; therefore, 
if we attempt to use the apparent relationship between 
critical thinking and rationality to support the 
relationship between critical thinking and epistemology 
we are at a loss.
The relationship between critical thinking and
20epistemology has been developed elsewhere and far more 
convincingly than here where the vagueness of 'rationality' 
and its linkage to critical thinking provides only weak 
support in establishing a conceptual link between critical
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thinking and epistemology. However, the relationship 
afforded by that very vagueness and the similar linkage 
rationality and epistemology share with critical thinking 
make it very clear that if epistemology is proven to be 
unworkable so too goes critical thinking and hence 
rationality. Or if critical thinking is proven to be 
unworkable, rationality and epistemology will suffer the 
same fate. I do not think I need to spell out what happens
if rationality fails - the correlation is pretty clear.
The big question is: Do any of the concepts discussed 
prove to be unworkable? The answer, as we shall see in 
Part V, is yes. But first we will look at the relationships
between argument analysis, informal logic, and critical
thinking. Critical thinking, as we saw, is an aspect of 
rationality and of epistemology, but argument analysis 
and informal logic are aspects of critical thinking.
(IV) The Relationship Between .Argument Analysis, Informal
Logic and Critical Thinking
No one can anticipate every conclusion or line of 
argument that may arise from his arguments. If it were 
possible, then there would be no unwanted or unwelcome 
or unwitting conclusions. But such there are. Some are 
more plausible and reasonable than others. The consequences 
outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis thus far are of 
that nature. There are other conclusions that are not
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McPeck decries informal logic by name rather than
just by its association with argument analysis. Basically,
he claims that logic as a whole, whether formal or informal,
cannot satisfy the goal of critical thinking because it
stresses form over content and it seeks validity over
relevance and acceptability, it ignores and demeans the
complex nature of information by treating information as
if it is unambiguous and comprised of 'mere' facts.
The charge that an argument is 'fallacious' 
requires first seeing it as having a certain 
pattern . . . But then, secondly, it requires 
determining whether the particular argument is 
of the fallacious or non-fallacious form. To 
determine if an argument contains a fallacy we 
must, however, go outside of the forms, so to 
speak,9and assess facts and beliefs about the 
world.
Unfortunately McPeck's criticisms of logic suffer 
from two failings: (1) they misinterpret the nature of 
informal logic and (2) they do not differentiate between 
formal and informal logic. He needs to do so. We have 
already dealt with (1) in Part III, Chapter Two. To 
recapitulate: informal logic takes note of and attempts 
to deal with and control for the ambiguities inherent in 
language and information. Like critical thinking, informal 
logic works with the content of statements as opposed to 
the form they plug into. Johnson and Blair, who McPeck 
uses as the focal point for the fallacy approach, state 
that fallacies are concerned with relevancy, sufficiency,
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No matter how the two are related, it is unreasonable to
deny the relationship. Deny it McPeck assuredly would
if he could, but he cannot. He would prefer to declare
that informal logic as it is conceived does not exist
because it claims to have the impossible inter-field
validity. However, he makes it clear that argument analysis
does exist and he says that attempts to formulate informal
34logic turn out to be nothing more than argument analysis; 
therefore, informal logic exists. Unfortunately for 
informal logic, for it to exist in McPeck's world, it must 
assume a totally different personality from the one informal 
theorists intend. To be facetious about it, informal logic 
both exists and does not exist according to McPeck, which 
shows his reasoning is inconsistent.
(V) Harvey Siegel on McPeck1s Conceptualization
of Epistemology 
In Sections I and II of this Chapter, where I concluded 
that McPeck must be using version (1) of what comprises 
a 'subject1, i.e. compartmentalizing life into areas as 
in subjects in school, to characterize a subject and that 
types of reasons are subject-specific. Knowing that 
critical thinking, which is subject-specific, is 
conceptually linked with epistemology, I am forced to ask 
if the above does not lead to the idea that there must 
be separate epistemologies rather than a single
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understanding of "the epistemology of the subject"
- "here we regard this sort of thing as a good 
reason" - without understanding why this sort 
of a thing should count as a reason here, but 
another sort of a thing as a reason there.
McPeck is thus his own worst enemy. In effect, he
stipulates a new meaning for 'epistemology' without
indicating his intention of doing so; hence, he is judged
on the common understanding of the word. I do not believe
he intends to offer a new meaning. I believe he thinks
he means epistemology as it is commonly understood. We
have more than Siegel's word that McPeck is operating
outside the common understanding of epistemology.
According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, we find
epistemology defined as:
The epistemologist . . .  is concerned not with 
whether or how we can be said to know some 
particular truth but whether we are justified 
in claiming knowledge of some whole class of 
truths, or, indeed, whether knowledge is possible 
at all. The questions which he asks are therefore 
general in a way that questions asked^^ithin 
some one branch of knowledge are not. (italics 
mine)
Contrast this definition with the characterization of 
epistemology outlined in Section III (p. 82). McPeck 
specifically states epistemology "includes understanding 
concepts and the peculiarities of the nature of evidence, 
as they are understood by practitioners in the field from 
which they emanate."41 (italics mine) The underlined 
portion says it all. As Siegel indicated, epistemology 
is meant to be general and trans-disciplinary. It is not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
meant to be subject-specific as McPeck indicates. Since 
McPeck does not expressly indicate he is stipulating a 
new meaning for 'epistemology', we must conclude he is 
attempting to operate within the established conception 
and this ambiguity weakens his account as a result.
(VI) The Consequences of Interlocking Concepts
Siegel could have done more than just weaken McPeck's 
account. By taking his criticisms to their logical 
conclusions he could have invalidated McPeck's concept 
of critical thinking. Although he did not, I will.
Let's review what has been argued thus far. In Chapter 
Two we learned that according to McPeck there are no 
generalized, trans-disciplinary skills, that critical 
thinking does not comprise such skills, that critical 
thinking and critical thinking skills are subject-specific 
and that critical thinking is conceptually linked with 
epistemology. These points are the cornerstones of McPeck's 
foundation. All his ideas about how matters develop in 
the rational/intellectual/thinking community rest on them. 
The last sentence also contains an extremely important 
proposition.
The overview of Chapter Three up to this point reveals 
that McPeck argues for and from a network of terms. 
Epistemology is connected to reasons, critical thinking, 
belief, and rationality. Rationality is related to critical 
thinking and epistemology. And finally, critical thinking
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connects directly with rationality, epistemology, argument 
analysis, and informal logic. Thus, all the above terms, 
which draw their mandate from Chapter Two, are conceptually 
linked with each other. As I have stated thus far in this 
chapter,this interconnectedness can lead to the devolution 
of McPeck's theories, because these concepts are all based 
on the same misguided assumptions.
In Section IV of this chapter we saw that McPeck would 
have to allow, on his own terms, that informal logic exists. 
It simply does not happen to be critical thinking. In 
Part IV we also saw Siegel aptly illustrating that McPeck 
distorted the concept of epistemology by making the theory 
of epistemology into separate theories of epistemology.
The word 'epistemology' functions, then, like the word 
'reason' or the various fallacy labels. We use the same 
name to refer to disparate things; they share only the 
name. Epistemology turns out to be subject-specific.
We could probably have reached this conclusion much sooner 
by noting that reasons are subject-specific and epistemology 
provides the best reasons for belief; hence, we may have 
concluded, with a certain amount of trepidation at taking 
this large a leap, that epistemology is subject-specific 
as well.
(1) Rationality
Notwithstanding the might-have-beens, what becomes 
clear is that the concept of epistemology does not work
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as it is supposed to do and that it takes the remaining
interlocking concepts with it. To begin with, rationality
follows the path laid down by epistemology, whether the
two are equivalent or not, simply by sharing the same
purpose. To intelligently draw on all available evidence
in order to solve a problem means drawing on all the
relevant evidence.
What constitutes 'relevant evidence' and where does
it come from? In "Paul's Critique of Critical Thinking
and Education" McPeck holds, according to Paul, that
Since there is a large number of logical domains 
and we can be trained only in a few of them, 
it follows that we must use our own critical 
judgment and/or defer to experts when we ourselves 
are not expert. It leaves little room for the 
classical concept of the liberally educated person 
as having skills of learg^ng that are general 
and not domain specific.
Paul counters that the world is not divided into logical
categories; human thought divides it up and it may be
divided in an indefinite number of ways. Concepts and
lines of reasoning lying clearly in one domain lay
simultaneously and equally clearly in others. Critical
thought is most important in our system of values and
interpretative schemes. A small percentage of time is
spent judging as specialists and we give broader meaning
to those acts. For example, a businessman may
interpret/assess schools on a business model, military
personnel on a disciplinarian model, etc. Paul's
prescription for rationality is to think critically about
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how we 'totalize' and use our experience. "We need to
pay special attention to those general skills of
critical-cross-examination, for they are what enable us
to maintain our autonomous judgment in the midst of 
43experts."
McPeck's theory of critical thinking does not allow 
us to ask multi-categorical questions that cut across 
disciplines. Yet what is required is a reasoned perspective 
from a 'global' view. Most social and world problems are 
dialectical, says Paul, and are settled by general canons 
of argument. From a logical atomist's viewpoint, where 
everything is placed in appropriate categories (Paul labels 
McPeck a logical atomist), dialectical, multi-categorical 
questions are anomolous; "When noticed the tendency is 
to try to fabricate specialized categories for them or 
to break them down into a summary complex of 
mono-categorical elements.
Questions, such as the justification of the invasion 
of Grenada, draw upon many disciplines for answers. In 
this instance, Paul states that in an attempt to reach 
an answer the disputants explored questions of morality, 
interpreting international law, spheres of influence, etc. 
Furthermore, such questions permeate everyday life.^5
McPeck agrees that there are problems that lie in 
several domains (to use Paul's terminology) and are 
roulti-categorical; however, McPeck has a problem with how
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domain-specific knowledge and understanding function to
solve real problems. The nature of the problem determines
4 6which domain(s) will be required. Different kinds of
knowledge are necessary to appreciate the different
dimensions of most problems and no single set of skills
47or clump of specific knowledge will resolve them.
McPeck uses the issue of alcoholism to explain what
he means. When we raise a question about alcoholism it
is a specific question and requires a specific kind of
answer, using a specific kind of knowledge. If we wish
to know how widespread it is, we are seeking sociological
knowledge. If we wish to know if it is right or wrong,
we are seeking moral knowledge. He grants that one kind
of knowledge can affect other beliefs; for instance, if
48alcoholism is a disease, then it is not a sin. In other 
words, what constitutes 'relevant evidence' depends on 
the subject, as we might expect from the development of 
his conception of critical thinking. To fulfill 
rationality's purpose, to be rational, comes down to being 
rational in a subject, just as epistemology depends on 
subject-matter. Therefore, whether we reach this conclusion 
by way of the previous argument using the analogy with 
epistemology, rationality becomes a series of rationalities; 
rationality is subject-specific; the only thing rationality 
shares across subjects is the name.
I do not think it is outrageous to suggest that "the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 02
intelligent use" of the evidence involves actually knowing 
and understanding the subject under consideration well 
enough to evaluate the evidence so that the conclusion 
you reach is not overly simplistic. The requirements for 
being a critical thinker, which is an aspect of rationality, 
are stringent. To have even a minimal understanding of 
a subject we must understand its often technical language 
- which, to my mind, includes knowing how and when to use 
it as well as knowing how to use the terms. If the 
requirements for a minimal condition of understanding are 
so stringent for an aspect of rationality, then the 
requirements for intelligently using evidence must.be 
equally stringent.
Unhappily the conclusion that follows this line of
reasoning is not one that anyone would wish to claim.
If intelligently using evidence is as difficult in this
age lacking Renaissance men as I have made out, then,
49despite McPeck's protestations to the contrary, only 
experts or near experts could meet this requirement. Only 
they could be described as rational because only they could 
be rational in their subject. However, they would only 
be rational in their areas of expertise. They, like the 
rest of us, would not be rational most of the time since 
they could only spend a fraction of their time in their 
subjects. Those of us who are merely mediocre in 
everything, who only live our lives as comfortably and
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satisfactorily as we can, would be not be rational at 
all.Since most of the world's population is merely mediocre, 
most of the world is not rational most of the time. We 
would be forced to depend on experts whenever any difficulty 
arose. The trouble with that is that not even experts 
agree all of the time. Not being experts ourselves, how 
would we choose between two, or possibly more, conflicting 
viewpoints among the experts themselves. We, and they, 
would become stagnant - unable to do or decide anything 
at all.
We could take this one step further. McPeck tells 
us that rationality involves intelligently using evidence 
for the solution of some problem. He has not placed any 
limits on the scope of the problem, so we could say that 
experts are needed to solve problems of any degree of 
difficulty. In that case, who shall we go to when we must 
decide between brands of toilet paper? Perhaps a discipline 
will spring up and we will have professors in bathrrom 
products. Life as we know it would come to a standstill 
since we would need experts in everything to function.
The above argument not only sounds absurd, it is 
absurd; however, any number of absurdities follow from 
construing rationality as McPeck does. Basically, we make 
overall judgments about rationality. A person is judged 
to be on the whole rational or on the whole not rational, 
not rational in this subject and not rational in that
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because he lacks relevant understanding. It even sounds 
ridiculous to judge a person's rationality, or lack thereof, 
on how much they know. Perhaps McPeck means something 
different for 'intelligent use of evidence1; however, his 
discussions of who can know enough to formulate sound 
beliefs and use evidence properly leads me to believe that 
the phrase is grounded in the acquisition and manipulation 
of knowledge.
Understand, JT am not suggesting that McPeck agrees 
with the concept of rationality as I have laid it down.
On the contrary, he more than likely subscribes to 
rationality as an overall characteristic, as I outlined 
in the last paragraph. What I am suggesting is that his 
arguments about epistemology, about subject-specificity, 
about rationality, and about the relationships among them 
do lead to the conclusion that rationality is 
subject-specific - with all that that entails. The absurd 
conclusions drawn from its subject-specific nature were 
taken to the nth degree, but doing so illustrated 
effectively how far astray McPeck's arguments can go.
(2) Critical Thinking
The next, most obvious concept to confront is critical 
thinking itself, because it is an aspect of epistemology 
and rationality, while argument analysis and informal logic 
turn out to be aspects of critical thinking. Since I have 
established the very real linkage betwixt the terms McPeck
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uses I will, for purposes of continuity, demonstrate how 
critical thinking is subject to the same unwelcome forces 
as epistemology and rationality. As with the other two 
concepts, critical thinking will turn out to be a label 
only. The concepts of critical thinking across subjects 
are being linked only by that name.
In truth I could illustrate the above point without 
reference to epistemology and rationality. I could simply 
examine the nature of critical thinking as McPeck has 
revealed it to us. However my arguments will appear more 
conclusive by displaying all the links in the chain. To 
be thorough, I will show what is going wrong with McPeck's 
concept both by examining and directly extrapolating on 
his arguments for critical thinking and by displaying how 
the arguments against epistemology and rationality encompass 
critical thinking.
First, we will examine McPeck's arguments for critical 
thinking. In Chapter Two where we developed those 
arguments, we discovered McPeck's claim that critical 
thinking is subject-specific. That was his most important 
conclusion, and it sets him apart from many other critical 
thinking theorists who believe critical thinking is a 
subject unto itself. If we stop and think about the 
implications of this conclusion, we realize that that means 
critical thinking is an aspect of various subjects. As 
we have seen, what counts as good reasons alters with the
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subject, sometimes how one reasons alters with the subject; 
therefore, the nature and criteria of critical thinking 
differs according to the subject. Seeing this we must 
ask ourselves, what is critical thinking?
McPeck's answer is contained in his two definitions.
We will use the first to illustrate how well they satisfy 
the question. According to the first definition, critical 
thinking is "the propensity and skill to engage in an 
activity with reflective s k e p t i c i s m . A s  you may recall, 
there were problems with this definition even when the 
features of critical thinking were attached; namely, an 
inability to decide what skills to bring to bear and a 
lack of clarity on "reflective skepticism."
To see that McPeck's concept and definitions become 
nothing more than empty labels we will look at Johnson 
and Blair's characterization of the fallacy faulty analogy.
1. An analogy is offered in support of the 
conclusion of an argument".
2. The two things being compared are not similar 
in the respg<j:t required to support the 
conclusion.
McPeck stresses that fallacies are so general as to be 
useless when used in particular situations. He stresses 
that what constitutes faulty analogy depends on the subject 
matter. Well, McPeck's definitions of critical thinking 
have the same flaw. They are necessarily so general to 
encompass cases of critical thinking in all subjects that 
they are useless in indicating when or how critical thinking
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takes place within those subjects. To assert that critical 
thinking occurs when an activity is approached with 
reflective skepticism, when the time to do so is right, 
avails us nothing. We cannot tell when an activity is 
so broached because McPeck has given us no guidelines to 
make that judgment. Nor do we know what skills to bring 
to bear, how to judge when the time is ripe to do so, nor 
when we ought to suspend judgment about the norms of the 
subjects themselves.
Thus, McPeck's characterization of critical thinking
as subject-specific has placed him in a trap. Critical
thinking comes to operate as McPeck believes informal logic
fallacies do. It becomes nothing more than a label
describing potentially many disparate concepts that share
nothing but the name. To paraphrase Harvey Siegel: critical
thinking is to be replaced by a series of critical thinking 
52concepts. What McPeck has given us are general 
prescriptions which, to pursue my own analogy with fallacy 
theory, can only serve to mislead us. Since McPeck makes 
critical thinking an important part of the process of 
education, he would need to provide more than a general 
prescription. He ought to outline what the concept of 
critical thinking is and how it operates within each subject 
since the nature of critical thinking changes from subject 
to subject.
Next, taking the more torturous path, we will look 
at critical thinking's downfall via its connection to the
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rest of the terms in the Network. As we have seen, critical 
thinking is an aspect of both epistemology and rationality, 
while informal logic and argument analysis also fall under 
critical thinking's auspices. Since critical thinking, 
epistemology, and rationality all ultimately proved to 
be unworkable since they are all founded on the same 
misguided premises and since all three are so closely 
connected that damaging one ultimately damages all, it 
is not unreasonable to suggest that those concepts that 
are aspects of critical thinking and that rest on the same 
faulty premises would suffer similar fates.
McPeck's use of 'epistemology' became vulnerable 
because his characterization led to the conclusion that 
there is no one single concept of epistemology. In effect 
there are separate concepts of epistemology corresponding 
to various subjects. The nature of epistemology alters 
with each subject, and the only thing connecting the various 
epistemologies is the name 'epistemology' itself. Due 
to its connection to epistemology as well as to its reliance 
on the same premises supporting epistemology and critical 
thinking, rationality also divides into a series of 
separate, subject-dependent rationalities. There is no 
one concept of rationality. The nature of rationality 
alters with each subject and the only thing connecting 
the various rationalities is the name 'rationality' itself.
Critical thinking, being an aspect of the two former 
concepts, is naturally subject to the same constraints.
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Thus, as the nature of critical thinking alters with changes 
in the natures of epistemology and rationality, we are 
forced to conclude that there is no one single concept 
of critical thinking. McPeck is left once more with 
separate concepts of critical thinking whose sole link 
is the label 'critical thinking1 itself.
(3) Informal Logic and Argument Analysis
We can take this line of reasoning two steps further 
by showing how informal logic and argument analysis also 
fail because they are aspects of critical thinking - 
ignoring for the moment that McPeck would prefer to say 
that informal logic does not exist at all. As critical 
thinking is constrained by the same limits imposed on 
epistemology and rationality because it functions as an 
aspect of them, so too are informal logic and argument 
analysis constrained by the limits imposed on critical 
thinking. Needless to say, those operational limits 
initially originate from epistemology and rationality.
Thus, informal logic and argument analysis do not 
refer to single concepts applicable across subjects 
(remembering that informal logic would not be informal 
logic as we know it for it to exist in McPeck's universe).
If critical thinking, to which they are so completely tied, 
cannot function as a single concept and must manifest itself 
differently in each subject, then its subsidiaries cannot 
either. The nature of informal logic and argument analysis
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must alter with each subject. Therefore, there are as 
many concepts of informal logic and argument analysis as 
there are subjects. The only thing connecting the sundry 
concepts of informal logic and argument analysis are the 
names.
(4) The Demise of McPeck*s Conception of Critical Thinking
McPeck's concept of critical thinking has lost much 
of its force due to its interconnectedness with other 
ill-defined terms in the rational firmament and due to 
the flaws arising from its reliance on subject-specificity. 
Moreover, when critical thinking turned out to be separate 
critical thinking concepts rather than one generalized 
concept, McPeck nullified his own project. He had intended 
to proffer the analysis of the concept of critical thinking 
that has been lacking in the critical thinking literature.
He did not intend to offer one analysis of one of 
potentially many concepts of critical thinking. This stance 
is evident when we realize that if the latter rather than 
the former were the case, McPeck would have identified 
not only which subjects the concept belonged to, but the 
definitions and explanations would have been specific enough 
to identify what kind of skills count as critical in each 
subject, and why. As matters stand the concept offered 
for our perusal is vague and, on a practical level, useless.
Practicality is not only desired but also essential 
because McPeck associates it with the concept of education.
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He may have said that education does not necessarily
53coincide with schools, which constitute the practical
aspect of education; however, when people, including McPeck,
discuss education and improvements in education they are
talking about improving the educational system. They are
talking about schools. They are talking about
practicalities. McPeck is talking about practicalities.
In his alliance of critical thinking and education, he
makes it clear that the best way to create critical thinkers
is by promoting a liberal education based on an
54epistemological framework. That is a practical suggestion
for inculcating critical thinking. When he notes in the
final chapter of Critical Thinking and Education that
critical thinking transcends schools based on education
and can belong just as well in other types of schools,
55such as training schools, McPeck again acknowledges that 
the practical side of critical thinking needs to be 
addressed in his discussion. Skill or skills, 
subject-specific or not, critical thinking is meant to 
be used, not just to sit there like some appealing yet 
otherworldly notion with no solid foundation. It would 
be shortsighted not to recognize this fact. Any conception 
that ignores this aspect of critical thinking would be 
seriously damaged. McPeck's conception does ignore this 
aspect of critical thinking and is damaged as a result.
Furthermore, from the results of my analysis of 
McPeck's concept of critical thinking and its underlying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 2
arguments, I must conclude that McPeck has shown himself 
to be inconsistent and to tacitly support standard 
theorists. Assuming McPeck is not only outlining what 
critical thinking means but is doing so in a critical manner 
(an assumption I think he would be loathe to deny), we 
must then ask ourselves - to what subject does his project 
belong? Critical thinking, after all, must be critical 
thinking in some subject. It cannot be education, although 
the concept of education and the concept of critical 
thinking are related, because McPeck clearly intends his 
concept of critical thinking to apply to many subjects, 
not just to education. Since the project does not. belong 
to education, and it is meant to apply to many subjects, 
then it can only apply to the subject of critical thinking. 
There is nothing else.
Yet critical thinking does not exist as a subject 
for McPeck. This fact puts us in a quandary. Clearly 
he intends his concept to apply across subjects. Yet just 
as clearly he denies that such a situation is possible. 
McPeck argued informal logic into non-existence based partly 
on its trans-disciplinary pretensions. Critical thinking 
became, not one concept but a set of separate concepts 
subsumed by various subjects, so it could not apply across 
subjects nor could it be a subject unto itself as standard 
theorists argue. By arguing the position that critical 
thinking is subject-specific while arguing from the position 
that critical thinking is a subject McPeck shows himself




This chapter has shown that McPeck's project, analyzing 
and establishing the concept of critical thinking, does 
not work. In addition to the counter-arguments offered 
against indivdual points in the literature come my concerns 
about the consequences attendant upon identifying concepts 
solely as subject-specific. Between the arguments McPeck 
employs and the language he uses, critical thinking proves 
to be a series of separate critical thinking concepts rather 
than an overriding, inter-disciplinary concept as McPeck 
needs it to be for it to be effective. As we have seen, 
this makes his account inconsistent and effectively quashes 
his concept of critical thinking.
Worse yet for McPeck, his employment and delineation 
of terms related to critical thinking, like rationality 
and epistemology, in order to"explain critical thinking 
contribute to the above conclusion due to their vagueness 
and reliance on the same weak premises that the concept 
of critical thinking itself rests on. To explain critical 
thinking by referring to other terms we can expect that 
(1) there are differences between the terms, (2) McPeck 
knows the differences and the similarities, and (3) he 
clearly expresses them. Because he fails to do so, we 
can plausibly read connections and consequences into his 
arguments that he does not intend, may not see, and would
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wish to avoid. This is the situation we meet with in his 
explication of critical thinking.
Moreover, when one term is subsumed by another, and 
when both terms depend on different subjects for the forms 
they take, the link between the two terms becomes that 
much closer. For example, McPeck's conception of critical 
thinking would not suffer so much if it were not dependent 
upon epistemology; and if, moreover, both concepts did 
not draw their mandates from the same weak arguments for 
subject-specificity. That being the case, when one term 
or concept, especially the dominant concept, proves to 
be contradictory, inconsistent, or weak, then the .other 
term suffers in the same fashion. For example, when 
epistemology was damaged, so too was critical thinking. 
This situation led to a chain reaction affecting 
epistemology, rationality, critical thinking, reasons, 
informal logic, and argument analysis. Drawing out the 
connections between them and then illustrating how each 
term falls on its own and how one term leads inexorably 
to the downfall of another and another and another in the 
network constitutes serious blows to McPeck's project as 
a whole. As more terms collapse in on themselves the more 
unlikely it becomes that his basic assumptions are correct; 
the more unlikely it is that he will be able to refurbish 
or reinforce the arguments he initially offered in 
establishing the network. Thus I must conclude that 
McPeck's project, as well intentioned as it is, does not
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work and will not work without a massive overhauling.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION 
BACK TO BASICS
As a rule it is easier to destroy than to build.
After centuries of conquering and maintaining territory, 
the Roman Empire fell in what amounts to a heartbeat.
The same can be said for the lifestyle in the Southern 
United States. The basis of culture, the economy, the 
'aristocratic1 citizens, everything that made the South 
the South disappeared within the space of five years.
The American Civil War quickly leveled a system and cities 
which took years to build. A building that took months 
to erect topples in hours or minutes when faced with a 
wrecking ball or judiciously applied explosives. The time 
and painstaking effort expended on creating a house of 
cards is all for naught when someone gives one quick puff. 
The house comes tumbling down.
The same can be said for building a theory. Enormous 
time and effort go into discovering, for want of a better 
term, an idea, seeking arguments in its favour and 
supporting them, anticipating and circumventing possible 
objections, and relating this theory to others in its field. 
That is to say nothing of setting it down in full, ready 
to be analyzed and criticized. The analysis and criticism,
11 6
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which in some cases amounts to the destruction, of the
new theory takes qualitatively less time and less trouble.
McPeck put much more into constructing his concept of
critical thinking than I or anyone else did in an attempt
to eradicate it. For this reason I think it is important
to do more than show what is wrong with McPeck's theory,
I think it is important to illustrate what is right with
his theory as well. He does have several good ideas that
have been largely ignored in the literature, which has
largely concentrated on where it goes wrong. To do McPeck
justice we should sort through the wreckage and salvage
what we can of his intentions and his theory.
It is for this reason that I have called this Chapter
"Back to Basics" in contrast to McPeck1s concluding Chapter
"Forward to Basics." McPeck had imagined that his
conception of critical thinking could be used as the basis
upon which the critical thinking of specific subjects could
be built; hence, we would be moving forward in establishing
the basics for each subject.
I would Q^IcPeck says]] envisage courses that 
included the epistemology of a subject as an 
integral part of that subject. In a very real 
sense, approaching subjects in this way might 
be seen as moving forward to basics. It would 
be moving forward in the sense that our conception 
of what it would mean to teach a subject would 
change to include its epistemology as a 
fundamental component. And it would be teaching 
basics in the sense that there is no understanding 
more basic than that which epistemology provides.
Normally when people refer to 'getting back to the basics'
in schools, they mean returning to the three R's - reading,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
writing, and 'rithmetic - or to some other vision of what 
schools, most properly, stressed in the past and which 
they do not stress now. McPeck's "Forward to Basics" taps 
into this tradition. In it he expresses his wish that 
students in schools are taught correctly in order to create 
as well rounded critical thinkers as is possible these 
days. A liberal education is sometimes called for by those 
who yearn for returning to the basics.
I am suggesting that McPeck needs to return to the 
basics of his conception and if, upon re-examination, he 
finds his basic assumptions remain worthwhile, then to 
begin his work anew. It remains to be seen which .ideas 
of his are salvageable, whether they are compatible on 
first glance, and what the next step McPeck needs to take 
is.
(I) Rebuilding the Foundation 
The first thing to establish is that the core of his 
project is correct. What I called the ground upon which 
McPeck built his initial foundation remains intact; namely, 
there is a concept of critical thinking waiting to be 
revealed, and our concern is with discovering or 
establishing how it is manifested.
None of the four premises McPeck argues for and from 
are commonly accepted or sufficiently supported to be 
accepted. These premises were: (1) thinking is always 
about something in particular; (2) there is no generalized
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set of skill(s) called critical thinking; (3) critical 
thinking is subject-specific; and (4) critical thinking 
is conceptually linked to epistemology. In Chapter Two 
we examined a few of many strong challenges directed against 
them. He needs to reassess these premises and if he still 
believes they are necessary, then to try to clarify why 
they are essential and why they do the job.
McPeck does better when he cites the features which 
critical thinking must take account of. They have value 
and advance analyses of critical thinking. As I stated 
in Section IV, Chapter Two, I agree with the first feature 
that stresses not limiting critical thinking to the 
assessment of statements. To his credit McPeck builds 
this idea into his first definition which states that 
critical thinking involves "the propensity and skill to 
engage in an activity with reflective skepticism" (italics 
mine). However, apart from the fact that he does not 
develop non-statement critical thinking, I find some of 
the activities he lists as requiring critical thinking 
to be suspect.
For example, McPeck states that mountain climbing 
and competitive wrestling are two activities involving 
critical thinking. Upon reflection I must disagree. These 
activities depend upon doing rather than thinking about 
doing. When climbing a mountain most of your attention 
is directed at holding onto the rock, getting solid purchase 
for your feet, driving in the pitons. You are focused
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very much on the moment. The same can be said for 
competitive wrestling. When grappling with an opponent 
most of your attention is directed at the physical 
challenge. Little, if any, time can be called reflective 
or skeptical, let alone reflectively skeptical. Although 
it may be the case that a climber or wrestler reflects 
on the route and fighting approach beforehand, during either 
event, when there actually is a problem to be solved, 
reflection is largely absent. When the initial strategy 
does not work or when they encounter minor difficulties 
the climber and wrestler do not have time to reflect 
skeptically on various alternatives, but must simply react. 
Thus I would argue that some activities do not require 
critical thinking since they are reactive or reflexive 
rather than reflective.
Nevertheless, McPeck1s point about critical thinking 
involving more than assessing ..statements remains in force.
He only needs to expand on this idea by showing how critical 
thinking functions in a non-statement form and by 
establishing, not just listing, the types of activities 
this concept would be used on and why.
The second, third, fourth, and fifth features also 
reflect what a concept of critical thinking needs to account 
for and for the reasons espoused in Section IV, Chapter 
Two. Namely, I am referring to the fact that critical 
thinking is voluntary and directed, a task not an 
achievement concept, skills admit of degrees, and that
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the notion of "correctness1 is inappropriate in a concept 
of critical thinking.
The sixth feature, that critical thinking is equivalent 
to rationality, has proven to be misguided as McPeck has 
developed it in Critical Thinking and Education, but McPeck 
is to be commended for recognizing and trying to correct 
the problems that arise due to the opacity of related terms. 
He is to be commended for trying to remove the opacity 
even if his attempt failed. In this case, McPeck needs 
to develop thoroughly the differences and similarities 
among related terms if he wishes to link any of the concepts 
together to use their relationship to explain critical 
thinking.
The seventh feature implicitly linking creative and 
critical thinking should be explicitly made. Without this 
linkage, critical thinking suffers the same fate as logic 
in McPeck"s discussion of the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. Logic, he says, belongs 
to the context of justification and cannot initiate 
hypotheses."^ Critical thinking suffers a similar fate 
when divorced from creative thinking - which would be 
necessary for considering alternative solutions to problems. 
In his discussion of the contexts of discovery and 
justification we see, once again, an implicit alignment 
of creative and critical thinking when McPeck argues that 
the division is too exclusive and discovery (creative 
thinking) needs to mix with justification (critical
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thinking).
Finally, McPeck is correct in his tenth feature where
he stresses that critical thinking cannot be identified
with any form of logic. I assume he means both formal
and informal logic. Critical thinking, if it is supposed
to be a concept unto itself, must have its own identity.
However, I cannot agree that logic is in no way related
to critical thinking. Even McPeck admits formal logic
4
plays a small role in critical thinking. A small role 
is not no role at all. And although he asserted that 
informal logic does not exist, he must admit that some 
of its concerns are critical thinking's concerns.- For 
instance, both are interested in the acceptability of 
evidence offered for some position.
McPeck's two definitions, when considered alone, do 
not seem superior to or appreciably different from others 
in the literature. On the fac.e of it, they share certain 
traits. As I stated in Section III, Chapter Two, no one 
writing in the field of critical thinking has offered any 
negative commentary on the second definition. The first 
definition, while suffering from vagueness regarding 
propensity and skill and needing clarification, does not 
necessarily lead to the alliance of critical thinking and 
subject-specificity. Ennis also aligns critical thinking 
with reflective thinking without its becoming 
subject-specific.4 The question remains: what makes 
critical thinking different from reflective thinking?
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There are other good points worth mentioning in 
McPeck1s theory. First, knowledge/information is, as McPeck 
pointed out, complex, and assessment requirements mainly 
involve understanding the information and its complex 
relationships. It is more important to know what P and 
Q mean rather than the logical relations between them. 
Logical relations do not decide real public issues, the 
acceptability, relevancy, and sufficiency of information 
do.
Second, coming to a reasoned conclusion, whether it 
be the resolution of some problem or the acceptance of 
one hypothesis over another, depends upon understanding 
the evidence to those who understand it.
Third, I concede that using criteria depends on 
content, whether critical thinking is seen as 
subject-specific or not. We must remember that critical 
thinking admits of degrees; hence, a person may be a more 
effective critical thinker in one subject than in another. 
That does not mean criteria cannot be inter-disciplinary.
Finally, transfer of training has not been 
substantiated. Studies exist supporting both points of 
view - that transfer of training occurs and that it does 
not occur. Furthermore, logical subsumption ought not 
to be confused with psychological transfer. The same or 
similar logical rules might apply from subject to subject; 
however, that does not mean a person can apply them equally 
as well from subject to subject.
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(II) McPeck's Conclusion Versus My Conclusion
McPeck concludes that critical thinking is 
subject-specific and that different
areas/activities/subjects have different criteria. Based 
upon his arguments for subject-specificity, his peers' 
arguments against it, and my own intuitive understanding 
of critical thinking (intuitions being from whence critical 
thinking theories ultimately derive) I am forced to conclude 
that different subjects do, as McPeck suggests, have 
different criteria. But, and this is a big 'but', McPeck 
has gone too far in compensating for information having 
been ignored in the past to himself ignoring the 
similarities of assessment among subjects.
As things stand, with McPeck1s conception we cannot 
identify the field or subject that McPeck's criticisms 
and theories belong to. Critical thinking does not stand 
as a subject unto itself so they do not belong to critical 
thinking. He was not discussing critical thinking as part 
of any specific subject, not even education. The criticisms 
I directed at his theories suffer the same fate. When 
I accused him of setting up straw men in his attempts to 
defeat informal logic, I employed an informal logic fallacy. 
The fallacy was drawn from a non-existent subject and was 
applied to an non-existent one.
Presseisen, Chambers, Ennis, and Selman have reached 
a conclusion that I believe is acceptable. All four
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recognize the justice of McPeck's position. There are 
subjects that have unique criteria and must be assessed 
in unique ways; however, there are also criteria that cross 
such boundaries. Ergo, both sides are correct and have 
had one half of the answer all along. There are 
inter-field/discipline/subject and
intra-field/discipline/subject skills and criteria. Nothing 
matches an in-depth understanding of a subject, but an 
understanding of basic critical thinking skills and 
principles helps us get through life without having to 
enslave ourselves to experts.
(C) Overall Assessment 
We have seen that McPeck"s conception of critical 
thinking contains some good points, some of which have 
been subsumed by the standard approach. By and large, 
however, his conception and his analysis fail to live up 
to his promises and the expectations they give rise to.
He promised an analysis of the concept of critical thinking 
in order to delineate finally what critical thinking does 
and does not include, yet, his arguments inexorably lead 
to the conclusion that there is no unary concept. This 
being the case, there cannot be an analysis of the type 
he promised. The nature of critical thinking, the kinds 
of things it includes and does not include, will depend 
on the subject being critically thought about. The four 
premises McPeck based his argument on were never firmly
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established. (We saw some of the reasons why, but did 
not concentrate on the various arguments as standard 
commentators normally do.) He promised to separate the 
concept of critical thinking from other, related ones, 
but he did not do so adequately. The concepts became so 
closely intertwined that they suffered from the same malady 
afflicting critical thinking. Thus, I conclude that 
McPeck's analysis suffers from two maladies - inconsistency 
and imprecision.
The family business so lovingly established by Ennis 
and inherited by Paul survived the prodigal son's 
competiton. McPeck's 'family' utilized some of his better 
ideas in their own business and reinforced its share of 
the market. McPeck should be proud that he has affected 
the standard approach to such a degree; although, I do 
not believe he would be satisfied. If he wishes to become 
a long-term force, he will have to identify and utilize 
his strong points to begin anew.
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